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Current History

DECEMBER, 1989

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The outcome of current events in South Asia will have a significant impact on the region well into the next century. The struggle for control of Afghanistan, the political evolution in both India and Pakistan, Sri Lanka's ethnic dilemma and Bangladesh's development are among the difficulties discussed in this issue. Our introductory article notes that "decreasing United States activity in South Asia would not serve American interests. . . . Actual and potential developments make the area important to the United States in a new way."

The United States in South Asia

BY ZALMAY KHALILZAD

Senior Political Scientist, The RAND Corporation

HISTORICALLY, United States policy in South Asia has been characterized by various degrees of engagement. When it has perceived that the region is threatened by an outside power, Washington has tended to become seriously engaged. When the perception of a threat from outside the region has been low, the United States has focused on regional issues.

The 1980's were a period of substantial American involvement, motivated by strategic considerations. When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, Washington perceived that its broader interests in South Asia and Southwest Asia were threatened. It reacted in part by significantly increasing its involvement there. Ten years later, the strategic picture looks very different. Although the future of Afghanistan itself remains uncertain, Soviet troops have withdrawn—having failed to defeat the Afghan mujahideen—and superpower relations have improved considerably. Moscow does not appear to be as threatening as it did in 1979, and there is even some convergence of interests on specific issues.

Changes in the strategic environment may lead to a decline in the American interest and presence in South Asia in the 1990's. This is what happened in the past whenever superpower relations improved. But this time, the past might not be the best guide to the future. Major changes that are likely to engage important American interests are under way in the region. Nevertheless, it is an open question whether the United States will maintain a high profile to protect these interests.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan resulted in dramatic changes in United States policies globally and in South Asia. It immediately changed United States priorities and tactics: opposing and containing the Soviet Union in Afghanistan replaced nuclear nonproliferation as the primary United States concern, while engagement replaced disengagement at the tactical level.

The most dramatic change came in United States dealings with Pakistan. Before the Soviet invasion, United States-Pakistani relations were at their lowest ebb; United States security assistance to Pakistan had stopped because of Pakistani nuclear efforts. After the invasion, Pakistan was upgraded to the role of a frontline state worthy of United States support. The administration of President Jimmy Carter (1977-1981) made a determined but unsuccessful effort to establish closer security and political relations with Pakistan. Washington offered a package of \$300 million in aid, which was rejected derisively by Pakistan's President Mohammad Zia ul-Haq as "peanuts."

The administration of President Ronald Reagan (1981-1989) made a greater effort to improve United States-Pakistani relations. It regarded the restoration of the United States-Pakistani security relationship as one of its most important foreign policy objectives, and offered a more substantial assistance package: \$3.2 billion over a six-year period. This included the sale of 40 F-16 combat aircraft, which were superior to any aircraft in the Indian inventory. Washington also reaffirmed the validity of a 1959 cooperation agreement between

the two countries; among other stipulations, it stated that the "government of the United States of America regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the preservation of the independence and integrity of Pakistan."

The Reagan administration wanted to signal the Soviet Union that it took Pakistani security seriously, hoping to deter a possible Soviet military move against Pakistan. It regarded the Pakistani role as critical in containing the Soviet Union beyond Afghanistan in South Asia and Southwest Asia. As relations between the United States and Pakistan improved, United States access to Pakistani military facilities increased—although, for domestic political reasons, at times this access was restricted by the Pakistani government. The first six-year aid package was followed by a second package of \$4.02 billion in aid for the 1987–1993 period.

Although neither Pakistan nor the United States expected the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan, they developed a close working relationship in support of the Afghan mujahideen. The United States wanted to inflict increasing costs on the Soviet Union to delay a Soviet consolidation, to deter further Soviet expansion, and to gain time to improve United States capability and relations with Pakistan and the other states in Southwest Asia. Pakistan, in turn, hoped to modernize its armed forces with American support and to build up its nuclear capability.

The expectation that Afghanistan would ultimately be lost to the Soviet Union affected United States policy. As a result, for a very long time, Washington did not take the United Nations-sponsored Afghan negotiations on Soviet withdrawal seriously. The United States refused to provide weapons to the mujahideen marked "made in the U.S.A." As the war in Afghanistan continued, congressional support grew for greater aid to the Afghan resistance. After a period of bureaucratic infighting and increasing pressure from the congressional backers of the mujahideen in 1986, the United States decided to provide Stinger anti-aircraft missiles to the Afghans. In fact, during the 1986–1988 period, Congress increasingly took the lead away from the administration on the issue of Afghanistan.

The provision of Stinger missiles changed the nature of the American role in the Afghan war. The United States became more directly involved and its stakes in the conflict increased. The provision of Stingers also sent a signal to the Soviet Union that an important threshold had been crossed.

Another major change on the Afghan scene was the establishment of an alliance among the Pak-

istan-based mujahideen parties in May, 1985, a development actively promoted by the United States, which wanted the resistance to achieve a stronger international political presence commensurate with its military achievements. The establishment of a mujahideen alliance was regarded as a necessary first step. The Pakistanis, whose advice the United States had accepted about arms distribution and political dealings with the mujahideen, were initially ambivalent about the establishment of a such an alliance, fearing loss of control. Pakistan believed that it could manage diplomacy more skillfully than the mujahideen. But it eventually supported the alliance.

The combination of increased mujahideen military and political effectiveness raised the costs of the war to the Soviet Union. Mikhail Gorbachev, who became the Soviet leader in 1985, changed the direction of Soviet policy in Afghanistan. After trying to defeat the resistance through increased military pressure during his first year at the helm, he apparently concluded that the original aims of Soviet intervention were unattainable. Continuing to pursue an inconclusive military struggle, he believed, could jeopardize his domestic agenda and his effort to further a more flexible foreign policy.


Finally, the Soviet withdrawal was assured by the Geneva accords, signed in April, 1988, between the Soviet-sponsored Kabul regime and Pakistan, with the Soviet Union and the United States as co-guarantors.* The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan was a major victory for the mujahideen, the Pakistanis and the United States. It was the first practical result of the so-called Reagan doctrine, which aimed at rolling back communism.

Paradoxically, the Soviet failure in Afghanistan may also have contributed to the emergence of the "Gorbachev phenomenon" in the Soviet Union. Afghanistan had clearly added to Soviet difficulties—to the tune of \$10 billion annually on average, according to Soviet figures. Some 15,000 Soviet soldiers had lost their lives there. Moscow's relations with many countries, including the United States, had been damaged. Soviet difficulties forced Moscow to adopt alternative policies—in Afghanistan, at home and in its dealings with the West.

INDIA

The improvement in United States-Pakistani relations, especially the provision of F-16's (despite Indian objections), resulted in a weakening of United States-Indian relations. The increased Indian hostility was not surprising. Traditionally, India has sought regional hegemony and Pakistan has resisted. The long-term Indian security design for the region calls for the neutralization of Pakistan to eliminate the possibility that Pakistan might chal-

*For details on the Geneva accords on Afghanistan, see Barnett Rubin's article in this issue.



Remillard in The Christian Science Monitor ©1988 TCSPS

lenge the Indian role in the region. India has been particularly opposed to security ties between Pakistan and an outside power. Pakistan, meanwhile, has sought extra-regional ties to balance local Indian advantages.

Although aimed at strengthening Pakistan against any future threat from the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, American military assistance affected the relative balance between India and Pakistan. To limit the damage to Indo-American relations, the Reagan administration simultaneously sought improved relations with the two South Asian rivals. This objective was not always pursued consistently but, over time, it became a key feature of the administration's South Asia policy. The United States wanted to improve relations with India because India is a key state; it also wanted to encourage Indian independence from Moscow and to discourage Indian hostility toward Pakistan.

Improving relations with India initially focused almost exclusively on expanding economic ties, especially in the areas of technology transfer, expanded trade relations and joint ventures. In November, 1984, the United States concluded a

memorandum of understanding (MOU) on technology transfer, agreeing to sell India a super-computer. United States-Indian trade and joint ventures flourished.

Changes in the strategic environment—improving relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, and Soviet efforts to improve relations with India's big rival, China—increased India's incentive to diversify its relations and led it to react favorably to the American desire for stronger ties. After Rajiv Gandhi became India's Prime Minister, this trend included cooperation in the defense sector. Washington agreed to sell India a ring-laser gyroscope essential for the development of the inertial guidance system for a new Indian-designed lightweight fighter plane. United States-Indian defense cooperation has also included the provision of United States radar components for the Indian surface-to-surface missile that was tested in January, 1988. In return, American naval vessels have been allowed to visit Indian ports and United States defense officials have been given unusual access to Indian defense facilities.

But the two countries continued to differ on some

key international and regional issues. India opposed United States military cooperation with Pakistan and the presence of a large United States naval force in the Indian Ocean region. New Delhi was also unhappy about the pace of technology transfer from the United States. Some critics in the United States questioned the feasibility of promoting Indian independence from Moscow in the security field. This objective was perceived as unrealistic because of the magnitude, range and terms under which Moscow was willing to provide security assistance to India.

This criticism negatively affected the United States desire to transfer technology; defense officials feared the sale of high-technology items to India because they might end up in Soviet hands. Indian reluctance to conform to United States requirements concerning the "end use" of United States-supplied high-technology products was a further complication. But despite Indian disappointment at the pace of United States technology transfers and the persistence of some other important differences, United States-Indian relations improved during the Reagan period.

REGIONAL COOPERATION

The Reagan administration promoted regional cooperation among the states of the area. In 1985, Washington welcomed the establishment of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) which included all the South Asian states except Afghanistan. Washington also declared its support for the national integrity of the states in the area and expressed its opposition to secessionist movements.

Recognizing that the key to regional cooperation was improved relations between India and Pakistan, Washington also promoted Indo-Pakistani cooperation. Washington believed that such a development would increase Pakistan's self-confidence in the face of its fear about Indo-Soviet collusion against it. The initial impulse for improving relations came from Pakistan. In the face of pressure on his country's western frontier, President Zia wanted to minimize the possibility of conflict with India on the eastern front. In 1980, shortly after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, he proposed that India and Pakistan agree to sign a no-war pact, reduce their forces along their common border, renounce the acquisition of nuclear weapons and accept the inspection of their nuclear facilities.

So deeply embedded were mutual suspicions and

hostility, however, that even the Soviet crossing of one of the major South Asian security buffers did not significantly change the pattern of interaction between the two principal states of the region. India rejected the Pakistani proposals, expressing more concern about the consequences of United States support for Pakistan than about the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Nonetheless, four joint commissions dealing with trade, information, travel and economy were established in 1982. These commissions made significant progress and established a mechanism for improving relations between India and Pakistan.

But relations between the two rivals continued to have their ups and downs, and when tensions increased, the United States tried to facilitate a dialogue between them. A particularly tense period came at the beginning of 1987, when both countries carried out extremely large military exercises near their common border. Once again, the United States became involved and encouraged them to agree on a package of confidence-building measures including advance notification of military exercises.

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

Because of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, nuclear proliferation took second place on the United States agenda. Pakistan was a beneficiary of this change, receiving a six-year waiver in 1981 from the requirement of the Symington amendment (to the Foreign Assistance Act) that barred assistance to countries producing fissile material without international safeguards.**

The Reagan administration also hoped that if the United States provided security assistance to Pakistan, Pakistan's interest in acquiring its own nuclear weapons would decrease. The administration wanted to prevent Pakistan from acquiring and testing nuclear devices and hoped to obtain reliable assurances that weapons-grade materials were not being produced and stockpiled.¹ In the long term, Washington hoped that both India and Pakistan would sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), would accept International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) full-scope safeguards or would agree to binding regional nonproliferation arrangements.²

As far as nonproliferation is concerned, the efforts of the Reagan administration had mixed results; the nuclear issue has remained contentious. There is no evidence that Pakistan has already

(Continued on page 451)

Zalmay Khalilzad was a special adviser to the United States undersecretary of state for political affairs in 1988. Between 1986 and 1988, he served as a member of the United States State Department's Policy Planning Staff.

**Named for Senator Stuart Symington (D., Mo.).

¹Michael H. Armacost, "South Asia and the United States: An Evolving Partnership," address before the Asia Society of Washington, D.C., April 29, 1987.

²Ibid.

"Neither [Afghan President] Najibullah nor the resistance leaders . . . have enough legitimacy to reestablish even the weak state structure Afghanistan had developed before 1978. . . . As long as the Soviet Union, the United States, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Iran all back their clients, Afghanistan will remain . . . a fragmented society with firepower."

Afghanistan: "Back to Feudalism"

BY BARNETT R. RUBIN

Peace Fellow, United States Institute of Peace

THE departure of the last uniformed Soviet soldiers from Afghanistan on February 15, 1989, transformed the political balance in that country, although not in the ways foreseen by most outside observers.* Contrary to expectations, President Najibullah of the Soviet-backed government (who serves simultaneously as General Secretary of the People's Democratic party of Afghanistan, or PDPA) has muted factionalism within the regime and strengthened his grip on power. While the resistance movement of the Afghan mujahideen, supported by the United States, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Iran, China and others, made a number of territorial gains in 1989 and consolidated its hold over some areas of the country, the departure of the Soviet troops removed a major source of cohesion.

The mujahideen have thus far proved incapable of providing a viable political alternative to the Kabul regime; the conflicts among them have intensified because of the competing political agendas of their various factions. These include conflicts between parties competing for power or similar bases of support; Sunni mujahideen based in Pakistan and Shia mujahideen based in Iran; different sects

of Sunni Islam (Saudi-supported Wahhabism and the indigenous tradition of Hanifi Islam); the field commanders inside Afghanistan and the exiled leaders; traditionalists and Islamic radicals; Pashtuns and ethnic minorities; and Ghilzai and Durrani Pashtuns.¹

The maneuverings that have occurred since the February, 1989, withdrawal are comprehensible only if one bears in mind that this is not a war with just two sides; there are numerous Afghan contenders with various foreign supporters.

The Soviet Union supports the PDPA, which claims it is no longer a "Marxist-Leninist" party. The PDPA, founded in 1965, split into two antagonistic factions in 1967 and reunited under Soviet pressure a decade later. Each of the two main factions, Parcham and Khalq, have different social bases and are in turn split into subfactions that are loyal to different leaders and are based in different parts of the state apparatus.² One of Najibullah's major achievements since he took over the party at Soviet insistence in May, 1986, has been the reduction of factional conflict. Najibullah is currently the head of the Parcham faction, whose members are mainly ethnically mixed upper-class urbanites. Najibullah himself is from a Pashtun tribal family, which has helped him find a common language with the members of Khalq, who are often of similar ethnic backgrounds. Factional conflict, however muted, is not gone, and it could resurge at any time.

The PDPA-dominated government maintains tight control over the capital of Kabul and a somewhat looser presence in most other major towns and regional centers.[†] The government uses most of the main highways (with the exception of the Jalalabad-Torkham sector since November, 1988); it controls all airports and much of the flat steppe area north of the Hindu Kush and adjacent to the Soviet border. The government has reached peace agreements with some local groups, which it supplies as government "militias." In areas controlled by these militias, however, the government generally has no formal administrative presence.

*The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace.

¹See map of Afghanistan in this issue, p. 419.

²Afghans are about 85 percent Sunni of the Hanifi school, and most of the rest are Imami Shia, like the Shia in Iran. The Pashtuns (Afghans), the dominant ethnic group, are divided into rival tribal confederations, tribes and clans; the three largest groups are the Durrani, from whom came the kings of Afghanistan; the Ghilzai, the Durrani's main rivals; and the Eastern Pashtuns, who spill across the Pakistani frontier. The next largest linguistic group is made up of Persian speakers, many of whom regard themselves as Tajik. There are also important Turkic groups, Uzbeks and Turkmen. The Hazaras, a group of Mongolian origin, are also Persian-speaking, but their racial heritage and Shia religion set them apart.

[†]On factionalism in the PDPA, see Olivier Roy, "Le Double Code Afghan: Marxisme et Tribalisme," *Revue Française de Science Politique*, December, 1986, pp. 846–861; Anthony Arnold, *Afghanistan's Two-Party Communism: Parcham and Khalq* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1983); and Raja Anwar, *The Tragedy of Afghanistan: A First-Hand Account* (London: Verso, 1988).

The resistance consists of exiled political leaders and fighting units inside Afghanistan led by "commanders."³ Some commanders have established local civil administration. Nearly all commanders are affiliated with a party, but the type of affiliation ranges from ideological commitment to opportunism based on patronage relations. The commanders generally do not take orders from the exiled leaders. They derive their effectiveness and legitimacy not from party membership, but from their ability to function as local leaders acting as intermediaries with outsiders. The government militias have a similar structure. The commanders control most of rural Afghanistan, especially the mountain areas.

Commanders belonging to the Sunni Muslim majority are generally affiliated with one of the seven parties based in Peshawar, Pakistan. These parties act as representatives of the approximately three million Afghan refugees in Pakistan. Since May, 1985, these parties have formed a loose coalition called the Islamic Union of Mujahideen of Afghanistan ("the Alliance"). Four of the parties represent ideological and ethnic groupings within Afghanistan's Islamist ("fundamentalist") movement, which played only a marginal role in national politics before the war. The secular and tribal political leaders who dominated Afghan politics during the royal and republican regimes and who were associated with Afghan nationalism (including irredentist demands against Pakistan) have been deprived of direct representation in the exiled leadership. Both Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have supported the emergence of Sunni religious leaders in Afghan politics. Throughout the war, the United States subcontracted political decisions about which Afghans to support to the Pakistani military intelligence apparatus, the Inter-Services Intelligence directorate (ISI).

The former King of Afghanistan, Zahir Shah, has lived in exile in Rome since he was deposed by his cousin Daoud in 1973. He is a symbol of the tribally based traditional order in which religious leaders were integrated into the state as officials of the legal and educational systems, but not as political leaders. To many Afghans, he also represents the period when Afghanistan enjoyed relative stability and peace, some economic development and good relations with the United States and the Soviet Union. To the Islamists, he represents the period when the Soviet Union began to penetrate

Afghanistan through aid, especially to the military. The Pakistani government (mainly the late President Mohammad Zia ul-Haq and the ISI) has consistently prevented him from contacting the mainly Pashtun tribal refugees in Pakistan.

THE SOVIET WITHDRAWAL

The Soviet Union withdrew its forces under a United Nations-sponsored agreement signed in Geneva on April 14, 1988. In return for the Soviet Union's withdrawal over a nine-month period beginning May 15, 1988, the United States and Pakistan agreed to cease "interfering" in the "internal affairs" of Afghanistan. The text of the accords made it clear that this meant an end to aid to the mujahideen as of May 15.⁴ The accord did not mean an end to the war, because the mujahideen, who were not parties to the agreement, would continue their struggle against the Kabul regime; instead, it was meant to de-escalate external involvement as an essential step toward a political solution.

Congressional pressure in Washington, D.C., however, effectively changed the agreement between the superpowers. Critics in the House and Senate noted that the accord was "asymmetrical," in that it allowed the Soviet Union, but not the United States, to continue aid to its clients.⁵ American diplomats proposed to their Soviet counterparts an agreement on "negative symmetry," under which both superpowers would refrain from aiding their clients. Soviet diplomats refused, citing their treaty commitments to the government of Afghanistan. As an alternative, the United States proposed "positive symmetry," under which the United States would reserve the right to aid the forces it supported in proportion to continuing Soviet aid to Kabul. The Soviet Union never formally accepted positive symmetry, but it signed and subsequently implemented the treaty nonetheless.

The Soviet withdrawal took place in two stages; the accord provided for the withdrawal of half the Soviet troops in the first three months of the pullout. During this period, the troops retreated to garrisons along the ring road linking the main cities and along the roads leading north from Kabul and Herat, the main exit routes to the Soviet Union. After the troops withdrew, several regime-held garrisons and towns were captured or occupied by the mujahideen, although many fewer than their supporters had predicted.

By October, there were reports that the government garrison in Kandahar was on the verge of defecting to the tribally based mujahideen in the area, but the Pakistani-sponsored Islamic radical Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, leader of one of the two parties called Hezb-e Islami (Islamic party), entered the area with several hundred soldiers; the

³The major work on the Afghan resistance is Olivier Roy, *Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).

⁴Other portions of the accord provided for the repatriation of refugees and for various "international guarantees" of the agreement.

⁵*Congressional Record*, 100th Cong., 2d session, 1988, pp. S1588-S1608.

government garrison subsequently called for reinforcements from Kabul. In November, several hundred soldiers and officers again attempted a coup in Kandahar. The eastern front also wavered when the government garrison at the key border post of Torkham, along the main road from Peshawar to Jalalabad and Kabul atop the Khyber Pass, defected to the Pakistanis on November 3.

On November 4, the day after the Torkham garrison first defected, the Soviet Union announced that it was "suspending" its withdrawal in protest against what it called continuing violations of the Geneva accord by Pakistan, which was cooperating with the United States policy of positive symmetry. The Soviet Union announced the introduction of new sophisticated weapons, including Scud-B missiles capable of reaching Peshawar from bases in Kabul. Despite the announced "suspension" of the withdrawal and the continuing United States-Pakistani commitment to positive symmetry, however, the Soviet Union completed its troop withdrawal by the appointed deadline.

CONTENTION FOR POWER

After his appointment in May, 1986, Najibullah prepared the groundwork in Afghanistan for a Soviet withdrawal. His strategy included both an intensification of the counterinsurgency measures he had helped to implement as head of the secret police and the offer of political participation to other organized political forces. He formalized this offer in a proposal for "national reconciliation," which he announced on December 30, 1986.⁶ This proposal called for a cease-fire and negotiations among all Afghan parties, leading to a coalition government that might include both the PDPA and the resistance leaders. Equally important was the government's offer to incorporate into local power structures resistance commanders who agreed to cease fighting the government.

The resistance leaders and all significant commanders rejected the offer, but the Peshawar Alliance was unable to make a convincing counterproposal. After months of American and Pakistani pressure, it announced a partial list of an "interim government of Afghanistan" on June 19, 1987. This

list consisted entirely of members of the Peshawar bureaucracies and was led by a Wahhabi from the Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan in deference to Saudi financial support. It received little support from the commanders or refugees, and it was not recognized by any foreign government.⁷

As the Soviet withdrawal progressed, the maneuverings intensified. In November, 1987, Najibullah presided over a *Loya Jirga* (Great Council), which approved a new constitution and changed the name of the state back to the Republic of Afghanistan (the would-be revolutionaries of 1978 had changed it to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan). In June, 1988, he appointed Hasan Sharq, who claimed not to be a member of the PDPA, as Prime Minister. The resistance, however, regarded Sharq as a Soviet agent; like other attempts to broaden the government before the Soviet withdrawal, this maneuver failed. By October, as the security situation seemed increasingly unstable, factional struggles re-emerged within the PDPA.

Meanwhile, the United Nations was working on a "second track" of negotiations to complement the "first track," which had been concluded at Geneva. The purpose of the second track was to establish a new government in Afghanistan to make possible the return of refugees and the reconstruction of the devastated country.⁸ On July 9, 1988, at a press conference in Islamabad, United Nations Under Secretary General Diego Cordovez proposed the replacement of Najibullah's government by a "National Government for Peace and Reconstruction." This government, to be composed of respected figures who were not closely identified with either the Kabul regime or the resistance organizations, would serve for a limited period of time. Then a *Loya Jirga* would be convened; it would include representatives of all political, ethnic and social forces, and would approve a new constitution.

Since none of the major contenders supported the proposal, it failed to launch second-track negotiations. Both the Soviet Union and the Pakistani Foreign Ministry stepped in with new initiatives. On October 14, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev appointed Deputy Foreign Minister Yuli Vorontsov ambassador to Kabul. Vorontsov was apparently charged with overseeing the final withdrawal of Soviet troops and consulting with all the Afghan parties in an attempt to set up a more inclusive interim government.

In December, 1988, Gorbachev outlined a new diplomatic proposal. He reversed the Soviet position of the previous spring and offered to accept the American proposal of negative symmetry, accompanied by a cease-fire, an international conference aimed at insuring the neutrality and demilitarization of Afghanistan, and domestic negotiations in accord

⁶The national reconciliation plan may have been conceived in Moscow; it derives from Gorbachev's "new political thinking" much more than from any known developments within the PDPA. Najibullah announced the program only after he and the entire top leadership returned from a sudden visit to Moscow a few weeks after the Politburo voted to withdraw Soviet troops from Afghanistan.

⁷"Un gouvernement introuvable," *Défis Afghans*, February-June, 1988, pp. 14-15.

⁸On the second track, see Barnett R. Rubin, "Afghanistan after Geneva: The Next Round," *Orbis*, vol. 33, no. 1 (Winter, 1989), pp. 57-72.

with the principle of national reconciliation.

The United States, however, reversed its position and rejected its own previous proposal of negative symmetry. Citing the huge stockpiles and the new level of sophistication of weapons sent to Kabul (including Scud missiles and the newest model MiG fighter-bomber), the United States claimed that negative symmetry would give an unfair advantage to Kabul. Vorontsov nonetheless followed up the Soviet initiative by pursuing a proposal for direct talks with the exiled mujahideen leaders. Such direct talks with the Soviet Union, without the presence of the Kabul regime or the PDPA, had been the main political demand of the resistance leaders, and the absence of such talks had been their main objection to the diplomatic process.

After a lower-level preparatory meeting in Islamabad, Vorontsov met with a delegation headed by Burhanuddin Rabbani (who was then spokesman for the Alliance) in Taif, Saudi Arabia, on December 3-4, 1988. These discussions continued on January 6, 1989, in Islamabad. Contrary to the wishes of the Peshawar Alliance, the Soviet Union did not recognize it as the sole representative of Afghanistan's political forces. Vorontsov met with the Shia groups in Teheran and with Zahir Shah in Rome. He sent messages asking important commanders for meetings (Ahmad Shah Massoud, at least, refused, referring Vorontsov to Peshawar). Out of these talks, according to Vorontsov, a rough agreement emerged on a procedure for forming an interim government. Vorontsov accepted the idea advanced by the Pakistani Foreign Ministry of a *shura*. The *shura* was to include several hundred people, including representatives of the Peshawar and Iranian exiles, the ex-King, commanders, tribal elders, religious dignitaries and "good Muslims" from Kabul. Vorontsov insisted, however, that the "good Muslims" include representatives of the PDPA and Najibullah demanded that his bloc receive 100 seats.⁹ It was over this point that the Sunni alliance broke off talks in January. The Pakistani military had also blocked the more conciliatory approach of the Foreign Ministry in favor of a continued campaign for a military victory by the Islamists.

⁹Selig S. Harrison, *Paths to Peace in Afghanistan: The Geneva Accords and After*, International Peace Academy Occasional Paper, no. 1 (New York, 1989), pp. 20-21.

¹⁰See the interview with General Kim Tsagolov by Artem Borovik in *Ogonyok*, July 23-30, 1988, pp. 25-27, condensed and translated in "Will Kabul Fall After Soviet Withdrawal?" *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, September 14, 1988, pp. 1-5. The possibility of such a fall was a constant theme in discussions the author had in Moscow in June, 1988.

¹¹*The New York Times*, May 23, 1989.

¹²Sources on the University of Chicago Admissions Committee.

Washington, Islamabad and the Alliance rejected negative symmetry and manifested relatively little interest in measures for a political solution because they confidently expected that the Kabul regime would soon fall. They were supported in this expectation by nearly all Western academic and government specialists on the region (including this author). Some Soviet analysts, including a prominent general who had served as a military adviser in Kabul, shared this view.¹⁰

As the winter deepened, food and fuel became increasingly scarce in the capital. These shortages were widely attributed to a blockade of the capital from the north (along the Salang highway linking Kabul to the Soviet Union) by Ahmad Shah Massoud, commander of the Panjsher Valley and leader of the Supervisory Council of the North, which brought together Jamiat commanders from about six northeastern provinces.

Unusually heavy snows also played a role in the volatile situation. The United Nations reported dangerous levels of malnutrition among pregnant women and infants in Kabul; Sadruddin Aga Khan, the United Nations Special Coordinator for Humanitarian and Economic Programs Relating to Afghanistan, tried to arrange an airlift to vital supplies. However, few teams were willing to make the flight under the seemingly insecure conditions, and the Soviets began an air bridge that still continues, delivering food supplies and weapons in 25 to 40 flights per day.¹¹

Soviet soldiers accompanied their final pull-out along the Salang highway with massive bombing of nearby villages and Scud missiles fired as far as the upper Panjsher, which seemed to indicate Soviet fear of an offensive by Massoud. Hundreds of villagers were killed, and the wounded had great difficulty in finding treatment since the heavy snows blocked many roads.

After the withdrawal, a defiant Najibullah announced the imposition of martial law to a rally of thousands of armed party members in Kabul. Najibullah apparently decided that guarding against factionalism in the party was the first priority after the withdrawal, because a factionally inspired coup was the most immediate danger to his power. Prime Minister Hasan Sharq, who had sent his family to India and whose daughter had applied to the University of Chicago, resigned on February 20;¹² in a

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"The future of Sri Lanka may well lie in the hands of the Indian government, and if it continues to destabilize the Sri Lankan government, Sri Lanka may be on the road to a complete breakdown of civil rule and stability."

Political Decay in Sri Lanka

BY ROBERT C. OBERST

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ON December 19, 1988, Ranasinghe Premadasa was elected President of Sri Lanka.* His election marked the end of the Jayewardene era in Sri Lankan politics. From 1977 to 1988, Junius Richard Jayewardene had ruled Sri Lanka while it descended into what appears to be an unending cycle of violence. First, the country's largest ethnic minority, the Sri Lankan Tamils, became involved in a civil war; later, a second conflict developed involving Sri Lanka's largest ethnic group, the Sinhalese.¹ Thus Premadasa, the heir to the leadership of Jayewardene's United National party (UNP), found himself in the unenviable position of ending the Tamil insurrection in the north and east of the island, and overseeing the withdrawal of more than 50,000 Indian troops who had been brought to put down the Tamil insurrection and the Sinhalese insurrection in the southern, central and western portions of the island. In addition to these serious problems, Premadasa faced accusations that the UNP was dismantling Sri Lanka's democratic institutions.

Only 10 years earlier, Sri Lanka had been regarded as a model of democratic stability in the third world.² By 1989, some critics had begun to compare Sri Lanka with Lebanon rather than with the democracies of West Europe.

Sri Lanka received its independence from Great Britain in 1948 and experienced remarkable political stability for over 30 years. In six of the first seven elections after independence, the governing party lost control of Parliament. After each election, power was transferred peacefully to the opposition party. The political system was dominated by the

right-of-center United National party, which won the elections of 1947, 1952, 1960 (March), 1965 and 1977, and the left-of-center Sri Lanka Freedom party (SLFP), which won the elections of 1956, 1960 (July) and 1970. Smaller parties also played an important role in the formation of coalition governments. These parties included the Communist party of Sri Lanka and a Trotskyite party, the Lanka Sama Samaja party, which formed coalitions with the SLFP in the 1960's and 1970's.³ These two parties formed an electoral alliance in 1988 called the United Socialist Alliance (USA). Along with the Communist party and the Lanka Sama Samaja party, the alliance included two smaller parties, the Nava Sama Samaja party and the Sri Lanka Mahajana party (SLMP).

In addition to Sinhalese-dominated parties, Sri Lankan Tamils have supported parties dominated by their ethnic group. The dominant party in the 1960's and early 1970's was the Federal party, which merged with several independent and smaller political factions to form the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) in the 1970's. In the Tamil areas, the TULF dominated parliamentary elections in 1977 and District Development Council elections in 1981.

Sri Lanka's ethnic diversity has been at the center of the conflict and violence that the country has experienced in the 1980's. The Sinhalese are the dominant ethnic group in the country, with 74 percent of the population.⁴ They speak an Indo-Aryan language, Sinhala, and most of them are Buddhists. Because their language and ethnic group are found only on the island of Sri Lanka, the Sinhalese have a strong need to protect their cultural integrity and heritage. The second largest group, comprising 12.6 percent of the population, are the indigenous Sri Lankan Tamils, who speak a Dravidian language, Tamil, and are for the most part Hindus. They are related linguistically and culturally to the much larger Tamil population of southern India.

The Indian Tamils, descendants of workers brought from India during the nineteenth and early twentieth century to work on the tea plantations, were isolated on the estates and have developed

*Research for this article was made possible by a grant from the United States Institute of Peace.

¹See Robert N. Kearney, "Tension and Conflict in Sri Lanka," *Current History*, vol. 85, no. 509 (March, 1986).

²James Jupp, *Sri Lanka: Third World Democracy* (London: Frank Cass, 1979).

³Robert N. Kearney, "The Political Party System in Sri Lanka," *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 98 (Spring, 1983).

⁴This and the following population statistics come from Government of Sri Lanka, *Statistical Pocket Book of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, 1987* (Colombo: Ministry of Plan Implementation, 1987), p. 14.

their own cultural traditions that distinguish them from the Sri Lankan Tamils who arrived on the island in prehistoric times.⁵ Shortly after Sri Lanka's independence from Great Britain, the Indian Tamils were denied citizenship and attempts were made to send them to India. At that time, the Indian Tamils comprised about 12 percent of the population, but repatriation to India reduced their proportion of the population to 5.6 percent in 1981.

A fourth group of importance are the Sri Lankan Moors, who are Tamil-speaking Muslims. They are largely concentrated along the eastern coast of the island and are found at the southern end of a band of Tamil-speakers extending across the north of the island and down the eastern coast. They comprise 7.1 percent of the population.

For 30 years after independence, Tamil discontent with the actions of the Sri Lankan government grew. The 1948 legislation denying Indian Tamils citizenship and legislation making Sinhala the only language of government in 1956 planted the seeds of discontent.⁶ In the 1970's, two different constitutions (one in 1972 and the other in 1978) made it apparent to the Sri Lankan Tamils that the government of Sri Lanka would not alter its language policy and would not elevate Tamil to a protected or equal status with Sinhala. Tamil youths began to carry out sporadic attacks against police and government supporters. Open warfare began in 1983.

President Jayewardene and his government appeared unable to resolve the conflict, and the war escalated until the arrival of the Indian peacekeeping forces on July 31, 1987. The Indians went to Sri Lanka as part of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accords (July 29, 1987) between India and Sri Lanka, which established an Indian-enforced cease-fire between the government and the Tamil rebels. The Tamil rebels were divided into several organizations, and the most powerful group, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), refused to agree to the cease-fire and surrender their arms. In October, 1987, the Indians began an offensive against the LTTE, and several thousand Indians, rebels and citizens died over the next two months. Yet despite the strength

⁵For a description of this period, see Ashoka Bandarage, *Colonialism in Sri Lanka: The Political Economy of the Kandyan Highlands, 1833-1886* (New York: Mouton Publishers, 1983).

⁶For a description, see Chelvadurai Manogran, *Ethnic Conflict and Reconciliation in Sri Lanka* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 1987), Chapters 1 and 2, and Robert C. Oberst, "Policies of Ethnic Preference in Sri Lanka," in Neil Nevitte and Charles H. Kennedy, eds., *Ethnic Preference and Public Policy in Developing States* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1986).

⁷Janatha Vimukti Peramuna translates into English as People's Liberation Movement.

⁸*The Island* (Colombo), December 21, 1988.

⁹De Silva, R.K. Chandrananda, "Report on the First Referendum in Sri Lanka," *Sessional Paper No. II-1987* (Colombo: Government of Sri Lanka, 1987).

Table 1: 1988 Presidential Election Results

Candidate	Party	Votes	Percent
Ranasinghe Premadasa	UNP	2,569,199	50.4
Sirimavo Bandaranaike	SLFP	2,289,860	44.9
Ossie Abeygunasekera	USA	235,719	4.6

Source: *The Island* (Colombo), December 21, 1988.

of the Indian army, the Indians were unable to defeat the LTTE. Nonetheless, they inflicted large losses on LTTE forces and limited LTTE operations to the dense jungles of Mullaitivu and Vavuniya districts in the Northern Province.

Meanwhile, in the Sinhalese areas of the country, a leftist organization, the Janatha Vimukti Peramuna (JVP), intensified an insurrection against the government in response to the arrival of the Indians.⁷ By 1988, many critics viewed President Jayewardene as ineffective and unable to resolve the conflict. In September, 1988, he decided to retire and not seek reelection, and the leadership of the UNP passed to Prime Minister Ranasinghe Premadasa.

THE ELECTIONS OF 1988

Presidential elections were held on December 19, 1988. Premadasa ran against former Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike of the SLFP and Ossie Abeygunasekera of the USA. Premadasa won the election with 50.4 percent of the total votes polled (see Table 1).⁸ Bandaranaike received 44.9 percent, and Abeygunasekera received 4.6 percent of the vote.

The election was immediately challenged by Bandaranaike, who claimed that SLFP supporters were intimidated and that outright fraud occurred in many balloting places. These charges reflected a tendency toward fraud that had begun in the early 1980's. In 1982, in a special referendum to extend the life of Parliament for six additional years, electoral fraud was widespread.⁹ This was the first national election in Sri Lankan history where widespread fraud occurred. Fraud and the violent intimidation of voters became a part of every election held in the country in the 1980's.

In addition, the presidential election experienced unprecedented levels of violence. Voters in the Southern Province—the center of support for the Sinhalese Janatha Vimukti Peramuna insurrection—were frightened into not voting. In addition, in the Northern and Eastern Provinces, the LTTE threatened voters. A general air of violence and intimidation made the normally active Sri Lankan voter reconsider his decision to vote, and voter

Table 2: 1989 Parliamentary Election Results

Party	Seats	Votes	Percentage
United National party	125	2,837,961	50.7
Sri Lanka Freedom party	67	1,780,599	31.8
Eelam Rev. Org. of Students	13	229,887	4.1
Sri Lanka Muslim Congress	4	202,014	3.6
Tamil United Liberation Front (EPRLF, 7 seats; TELO, 2 seats)	10	188,593	3.4
United Socialist Alliance	3	160,271	2.9
Mahajana Eksath Peramuna	3	95,793	1.7
Independents and other parties	0	101,210	1.8

Source: *The Island*, February 17 and 18, 1989.

turnout in 1988 was about 55 percent of the total eligible voters.¹⁰ Although this turnout is higher than the turnout for elections in the United States, it is extremely low by Sri Lankan standards. Voter turnout in the October, 1982, presidential election was 81.1 percent of the eligible voters.¹¹ In the 1977 parliamentary elections, voter turnout reached an all-time high of 86.7 percent of the eligible voters.

The decline of the electoral process in Sri Lanka was rapid in the 1980's; President Jayewardene took little action to correct electoral abuses. President Premadasa had to try to restore democratic principles while controlling the elements of his party that had become carried away with the idea of winning elections. The challenge by SLFP leader Sirimavo Bandaranaike to Premadasa's election and increased violence in the country complicated these efforts.

The first task for the new President was the election of a Parliament in February, 1989. Under the French-style presidential government of Sri Lanka instituted by the constitution of 1978, the President rules with the help of a Cabinet formed by the Parliament. As in France, the system is dominated by the President if his party can control the Parliament. The 1989 election was the bloodiest in Sri Lankan history. The LTTE and the JVP carried out campaigns of assassinating election candidates. UNP and SLFP supporters also struck back at each other and at supporters of the JVP. In the end, voter turnout was low (63.6 percent), because many

voters once again decided that it was safer to stay at home.¹² However, the fraud that marred the 1982 referendum and the 1988 provincial council elections—impersonation and ballot box stuffing—did not appear to be as widespread.

President Premadasa won an overwhelming victory; nevertheless the UNP did not come close to gaining the two-thirds majority in Parliament it held from the 1977 elections until the 1989 elections. The party won 125 out of 225 seats in the new Parliament (see Table 2).¹³ This was the first parliamentary election held under the 1978 constitution's system of proportional representation.

Although a significant number of small parties contested the election, none did well. As in past elections, Tamil voters chose to support Tamil parties rather than one of the Sinhalese parties. Among the Tamil parties, representatives of the Eelam Revolutionary Organization of Students (EROS) ran as independents in the north and east. (It was rumored that they were running with the approval of the LTTE.) They did very well in the LTTE stronghold of the northern Jaffna peninsula, where they finished first. The only other Tamil party to do well was a coalition of the TULF and two former guerrilla groups, the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO) and the Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF). The former guerrilla groups won the nine TULF district seats. The TULF leader, A. Amirthalingam, was later named to the national seat won by the party.

Of importance to the Sri Lankan Muslim population was the appearance of the first successful Muslim political party. The Sri Lanka Muslim Congress won four seats in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. Its limited success may be an indication of an awakening sense of nationalism among Sri Lankan Muslims.

With a fresh majority in Parliament, President Premadasa began to tackle the main problem facing Sri Lanka, the increased violence. His plan was relatively simple. If he settled the Tamil insurrection, there would be no need to maintain the Indian troops in the country. Since the Indian troops were important in instigating the JVP insurrection, it was believed that the withdrawal of the Indian force would reduce support for the JVP. The primary, but not the only, demand of the JVP was the removal of the Indians from Sri Lanka.

Premadasa opened direct negotiations with the LTTE in the Sri Lankan capital of Colombo on May 4, 1989. For the first time since the LTTE began killing pro-government supporters and police in the 1970's, the government of Sri Lanka negotiated directly with representatives of the Tamil guerrillas. Since 1983, negotiations had proceeded with the Indian government acting as an in-

¹⁰*The Island*, December 21, 1988.

¹¹Craig Baxter, Yogendra K. Malik, Charles H. Kennedy and Robert C. Oberst, *Government and Politics in South Asia* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987), p. 303.

¹²*The Island*, February 18, 1989.

¹³*Ibid.*

termediary. At times, there had been face-to-face discussions like the 1985 negotiations in Thimpu, Bhutan; however, the Indians were the chief negotiators. Their role was so important that the government even communicated through the Indians with the legally dominant TULF.¹⁴

INDIA'S ROLE

The Indian role was a logical extension of Indian involvement in the Sri Lankan conflict. India was used for training bases and staging operations by the Tamil guerrillas, and the Indian government supplied military officers to train the guerrillas.¹⁵ In addition, the large Tamil population in southern India supported the rebels and demanded that the Indian government take action to stop the Sri Lankan government's abuse of Tamils in Sri Lanka. The Indians also saw the importance of maintaining a stable political system in Sri Lanka; instability might threaten Indian interests.

Premadasa's negotiations began to succeed. At the end of June, 1989, the LTTE agreed to transform the cease-fire that had been in effect since the start of the negotiations into a cessation of hostilities, and to negotiate with the government over other differences, expressing faith in President Premadasa's goodwill. In return, the government offered to discuss the possibility of increasing the powers of the provincial councils that were created by the Thirteenth Amendment to the constitution in November, 1987 (and elected beginning in April, 1988).

In early June, President Premadasa had demanded the withdrawal of the Indian troops by July 29, 1989. The Indians, who were annoyed with the new President over his direct negotiations with the LTTE, refused to leave because of logistical problems connected with the withdrawal. Their reaction was in part a face-saving device. The Indian government had been embarrassed by Premadasa's negotiations and his agreement with the LTTE, which did not include the Indians. In addition, the Indians were concerned that the LTTE would kill the members of other Tamil rebel groups, who had laid down their arms after the arrival of the Indians in July, 1987. These groups included the EPRLF, TELO and the Popular Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE).

In provincial council elections to the combined Eastern and Northern provincial council on

¹⁴In an interview in Colombo in June, 1988, TULF leader A. Amirthalingam indicated that the Sri Lankan government had not communicated with him directly for 5 years.

¹⁵India's direct involvement was confirmed by two leaders of different guerrilla groups in June and July, 1988.

¹⁶Prabakaran's death has not been confirmed. This is not the first time he has been reported to be dead (see *The Island*, August 19, 1987).

November 19, 1988, the EPRLF won 41 of the 71 seats contested. However, the LTTE boycotted the election and the only other guerrilla group to contest was the Eelam National Democratic Liberation Front (ENDLF), which won 12 seats. As the legally elected government of the Eastern and Northern Provinces, these groups increased their cooperation with the Indian Peacekeeping Forces (IPKF). This cooperation had begun with the arrival of the IPKF in 1987. The EPRLF and TELO identified LTTE supporters for the IPKF and assisted the Indians in their operations against the LTTE. India's fear in 1989 was that the Indian departure would precipitate a bloodbath.

Before Premadasa asked the Indians to leave the country, the EPRLF-dominated Eastern and Northern provincial government created a Civilian Volunteer Force (CVF), an attempt by the EPRLF to rearm and protect itself from the LTTE. Following the creation of the CVF, there were numerous allegations that the CVF was kidnapping youths to become part of the force. The Indians were unwilling to leave Sri Lanka until they could be assured that the LTTE would not kill the groups that had supported India. In addition, they refused to go along with the Premadasa government's cease-fire with the LTTE.

In the event, Premadasa's plan to end the violence in Sri Lanka was foiled by the Indians. The LTTE would not come to an agreement with the government until the Indians left the country. In addition, Premadasa lost face with his Sinhalese supporters. His inability to force the Indians to leave Sri Lanka displayed his government's weakness. It also added credibility to the JVP's arguments that the Indians would never leave Sri Lanka. By the end of July, 1989 (the second anniversary of the arrival of the IPKF), violence by the JVP had increased and Premadasa was forced to accept a continued Indian presence.

In addition, the assassination of most of the important Tamil leaders in Sri Lanka in July increased doubts about the President's ability to end the violence. Appapillai Amirthalingam, the leader of the TULF, and Vettivelu Yogeswaran, a former TULF member of Parliament, were shot in Colombo on July 13. Three days later, Uma Maheswaran, the founder and leader of PLOTE, was killed. A few days later it was reported that V. Prabhakaran, the leader of the LTTE, had been shot by another faction in his organization.¹⁶ Initial reports indicated

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"If dynastic dominance ceases in New Delhi, the supply of skilled people may facilitate creative realignment of political forces and the reconstitution of coherent government at the state and national levels. . . . If it had time to take root, realignment could also produce a reasonably rational, workable political system. There are many reasons why this may not occur."

India: State and Society Diverge

BY JAMES MANOR

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THE Indian elections of December, 1989, the largest free exercise of the franchise in human history, herald major political changes in that vast country. India stands at the beginning of a new phase in its political history; the members of the Nehru-Gandhi dynasty will no longer be dominant. Even if Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi wins the election, his parliamentary support will be severely reduced from the four-fifths majority he enjoyed after 1984. As a result, he will be forced to deal generously and often with members of his Congress-I party, lest schisms put his majority at risk. This will involve a major change from the autocratic approach taken by Gandhi and, earlier, by Indira Gandhi, his mother. Rajiv Gandhi's reputation as a vote-winner will also suffer, and this is what persuaded the many opportunists in his party to remain silent and obedient.

If Gandhi loses the election, it will become apparent that the Congress-I party is riddled with factional squabbles at the national and the state levels, and in every part of India. Indeed, Congress-I is almost as fragmented in most regions as the opposition, which is famous for its disunity. In many areas, Congress-I is actually worse off. So no matter who forms the next government in New Delhi, India is due for a period — probably a long period — of instability in the national Parliament and in many state legislatures.

This does not mean, however, that India's survival, its unity or even its well-being will be seriously threatened. Despite a certain amount of confusion and disorientation, state and national governments often prove responsive to pressure from various interest groups. It may become easier to build coalitions of social groups that have more in common than the diverse groups that have gathered under the banner of Congress-I.

Coalitions are likely to contain fewer contradictions; therefore the relationship between political parties and their social bases may become clearer and more rational. In this environment, state and national governments would be less likely to try to please nearly everyone with programs that contain

internal contradictions. In this more fluid situation, when governments perform badly, social forces may be able to realign behind alternative parties.

All this coalition-building will certainly mean more political untidiness, but it may also make the system more democratic. And while it can be said — both in the subcontinent and abroad — that in these circumstances India may fall apart, that is nonsense. First of all, the massive coercive power of the central government is more than capable of preventing secession. And, second, regional separatist movements seldom develop much momentum, because social and cultural heterogeneity within regions means that there is insufficient solidarity at that level to fuel separatism.

Since late 1984, when he assumed office, Gandhi has changed direction abruptly and radically on many occasions. This tendency, which is the result of inexperience, has produced instability and confusion within his government. Never has India seen ministers transferred so rapidly in and out of posts in the central Cabinet and state governments. And when a minister changes posts, senior bureaucrats tend to be replaced in large numbers, to give the incoming new minister a free hand. This has led not just to instability, but to turbulence in many government departments.

It is, however, in matters of policy that instability is most acute. Gandhi began 1985 determined to liberalize the economy, to do away with the many permits and licenses entrepreneurs needed to produce or import goods. A year later, Gandhi had encountered so much resistance to change — for which he had failed to prepare the political ground — that he slowed the process down; by 1987, he had largely abandoned it. Gandhi then reached a bold agreement with Sikh leaders, offering and receiving substantial concessions in an effort to overcome the dangerous alienation of this key group. But he soon discovered that he had again gone too far, and he again overcompensated. These maneuvers angered many people, including non-Sikhs who opposed the initial concessions and Sikhs who felt betrayed when Gandhi reneged.

In 1986, Rajiv Gandhi announced a major overhaul of his corrupt and badly fragmented party. He assigned a tough political operator to restructure it thoroughly. Ten months later, predictable protests from party bosses, who were losing influence in the reorganization, appeared to have come as a surprise to the Prime Minister and led him to dismiss reforms and abandon the attempt altogether.

Early in his term of office, Rajiv Gandhi appeared to be determined to rebuild the formal political institutions that his mother, Indira Gandhi, had undermined. For example, his law minister announced that punitive transfers of judges whose rulings were distasteful to the Prime Minister would cease. This was an attempt to restore the autonomy of the judiciary and to strengthen it by convincing the best legal talent to return to the bench. But within two years, transfers were again taking place and other measures to revive institutions at the expense of personalized government had been abandoned.

Such tergiversations—and there are plenty of other examples—make Prime Minister Gandhi appear confused and indecisive, characteristics that were seldom applied to his mother. Gandhi's government has been haunted by ambiguity and muddle, but important underlying realities in the social and political system cry out for attention.

THE DIVERGENCE OF STATE AND SOCIETY

The simultaneous occurrence over the last two decades of both a political awakening and political decay has prepared the ground for the divergence of society and state. The electorate is maturing and interest groups all across India are becoming more aware. This trend is strongest among prosperous and educated groups, but the poor are also more aware of their rights, more assertive politically and more impatient with unresponsive politicians.

At the same time, political institutions—including political parties that are important in India—have become less effective as a result of internal decay. This is partly explained by the natural processes of stagnation, but the pattern owes much to the efforts of politicians—especially Indira Gandhi and many of her lieutenants at the state level in this federal system—to undermine the strength of institutions in the interests of personal and dynastic rule.¹ For institutions to degenerate when an elec-

torate is demanding more of them risks the divergence of those institutions from society.

This is a complex process. Leaders of social groups, who once found politicians willing and able to provide them with resources and services that could be distributed among their followers, have lately been frustrated. Instead of offering substantial concessions to those whose political appetites are growing, politicians often offer nothing, seek exorbitant bribes or threaten harassment if the petitioners do not abandon their request. After such experiences, and after reading press reports about the criminal behavior of some politicians, leaders of social groups often come to regard politicians and politics as unclean, and abandon contact with the political system.²

When this occurs, social groups tend to turn inward and rely on their own resources. This often leads them to focus on narrow definitions of their collective identities and to emphasize adversarial relations with other groups. Conflict with other groups tends to grow more frequent and more intense. This often leads to collective violence that attracts repressive, sometimes brutal responses from the authorities; in turn, this deepens the alienation and bitterness.³

Observing the quickening of social conflict from atop the national or state political systems, politicians also grow impatient. Political decay has often deprived them of the reliable party organizations that once provided two vital resources: the information they need to understand and anticipate social conflicts; and the instruments to reach out to discontented groups and arrange accommodations between them. Without these resources, politicians are often thrown off guard by social disorder, so that they turn quickly to coercion. They become distrustful of society and despair of interacting creatively.

As a result of this divergence of state and society, two further trends have become significant. Each is a reaction to the other. The first, a tendency among those near the apex of the political system toward statism, follows logically from the increasing separation of the state and society. The second, a grass-roots antipolitical tendency, follows from the increasing separation of society and the state.

The elite statists fall into two categories, each of which seeks a strong state. Some want a state whose strength resides mainly in its capacity for brisk, assertive managerial leadership, while others stress the importance of the state's coercive powers. Because the state cannot, in their view, play much of a mediating role in society, it must either provide clear, compelling managerial leadership or it must arm itself to meet social turbulence with force, or both.

¹See James Manor, "India: Awakening and Decay," *Current History*, March, 1986, pp. 101-104 and 136-137; and Atul Kohli, ed., *India's Democracy: An Analysis of Changing State-Society Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).

²This set of comments, and several other such passages, are based on interviews that the author has had in many different parts of India since the early 1970's.

³James Manor, *Collective Conflict in India* (London: Centre for Security and Conflict Studies, 1988).

Those who stress the need for modern management seek a state that seldom engages in accommodation or even in dialogue with social groups, but that concentrates on manipulating society according to a cold efficiency. The managerial elite perceives itself as the bearer of a rationality that the unlettered masses of India lack. This elite often regards open, competitive politics as an inconvenience, a source of great untidiness and of dysfunctional "noise" in what ought to be a smoothly running, centrally administered system.

Those statisticians who stress the need for coercion argue that the nation-state is in danger, and that it needs to be protected by draconian means. They tend to view the nation-state as the expression of the essence of Indian civilization, without which that civilization might somehow disintegrate.⁴ Therefore, they seek occasional demonstrations of firm government, and their appetite for force grows when they consider the repeated failures of the police to cope with social disorder.

The statisticians have not managed to dominate Rajiv Gandhi's regime. He has often leaned toward this camp and yet, at other times, with characteristic inconsistency, he has adopted other postures. But given the extent to which conflict develops in India, the statisticians may gain more influence.

The growth of statism is paralleled by a reaction at the base of the system. At times, this reaction is merely anti-statist, seeking a decentralization of power within the political system, but it also contains more uncompromising elements voicing sentiments that are fully antipolitical—in that they oppose involvement of any kind with the state. All these people place great faith in what they see as a flowering of voluntary self-help associations, initiatives, protest movements and so on at the grass roots all across India. They seek to encourage the self-sufficiency of such grass-roots entities, and they often suspect concentrations of power in public or private hands.⁵

One of the milder manifestations of this variegated set of tendencies—which in the end could undermine the more anarchistic elements within it—is the recent creation in several Indian states of new political institutions close to the local level, to which significant powers have sometimes been devolved. Most notable are the Zilla Parishad institutions that have been built up by very different non-Congress party governments in the states of Karnataka and West Bengal. Rajiv Gandhi has himself become interested in creating such institu-

tions. Indeed, he spoke of little else through mid-1989. But many observers worry that he may see the movement mainly as a way of eroding the power of state governments that opposition parties often control.

Countervailing tendencies may prevent the divergence of state and society from threatening open, representative politics. If the end of dynastic dominance leads to political parties that are more responsive to social groups, then the breach between state and society could be bridged here and there. Such parties would in effect be reviving and adapting to changed conditions the old politics of patronage, bargaining and coalition-building, which Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru's Congress party used so well before 1964. This mode of politics entails a rebuilding of parties so that they become better able to respond to an increasingly awakened electorate, thereby establishing a *modus vivendi* with diverse social groups.

One further comment is in order about the statisticians who stand near the apex of the political system. Both the strong state that they envision and the Indian state that now exists are huge, expensive entities. The statisticians' loss of faith in the state as an instrument for social change or grass-roots development forces them to develop a new rationale to justify the state's existence. They have responded in two ways. First, they have sought to create popular fear of foreign threats to India and of fifth columnists within the country. This was a central theme in Rajiv Gandhi's 1984 election campaign.

Second, the statisticians have tended, through the 1980's, to mount spectacular events that are meant to win popular acclaim. Major international conferences and visits are staged—the Nonaligned Movement's conclave, the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting, visits by Queen Elizabeth II and then the Prince of Wales. The Asian Games were staged in new stadia, the construction of which cost more than the whole of India's first five year plan. (Supervision of that construction and of the Asian Games was Rajiv Gandhi's first task in public life.) An Indian cosmonaut was sent into orbit on a Soviet space vehicle; India launched its own satellites; it acquired a second aircraft carrier and a nuclear submarine; and sent a boatload of scientists to Antarctica. All these events received enormous attention in the government-controlled media. An assertive foreign policy in the South Asian region—which is a result of other considerations as well—fits logically into this set of tendencies.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

India's foreign policy has grown more assertive under Rajiv Gandhi, especially within the South Asian region. This is in many ways an extension of

⁴Ashis Nandy, "Images of the Indian State," unpublished manuscript.

⁵For a subtle analysis of recent events from an anti-statist viewpoint, see Rajni Kothari, *Politics and the People: In Search of a Humane India*, 2 vols. (New Delhi: Ajanta Publishers, 1989).

trends that gathered momentum in Indira Gandhi's time (1966–1977, 1980–1984). It was Indira Gandhi who for the most part abandoned the effort of her father, Jawaharlal Nehru, to gain global prestige via nonalignment and bridge-building between East and West; she replaced it with something resembling a Gaullist attempt to win India pre-eminence within South Asia. But it is only recently that New Delhi's actions have attracted widespread comment—and condemnation—in the international press.

This must be carefully examined because the situation is complex and ambiguous. Powerful figures in the political elite (mainly but not only in Rajiv Gandhi's circle) and in India's defense and foreign policy establishments favor an aggressive posture within and beyond South Asia. But in all these sectors, there are also voices arguing for restraint. One key foreign ministry official privately told this writer that he regarded the hawks as "sick," and he has allies aplenty, not least among senior military commanders. Neither side in this dispute has yet prevailed, and Rajiv Gandhi's tendency to vary his postures and rhetoric has added to the uncertainty.

The three main examples that are usually offered to show that India is—in *The Economist's* words—"starting to bully" need to be scrutinized.⁶ They are India's involvement in Sri Lanka; its action to thwart a coup in the Maldives; and its recent dispute with Nepal. Of these, the first is the most significant, the mostly costly (not least in Indian lives, over 1,000 of which have been lost) and the most complex.

India undertook its initiative in Sri Lanka in mid-1987 for many reasons. The hawks in New Delhi wanted to compel Sri Lanka's government to give India a veto over the use of strategic port facilities. The Indian government wanted to prevent Sri Lanka's army from perpetrating large-scale massacres of noncombatants in the main Tamil city of Jaffna, which it had surrounded. That army had frequently indulged in such atrocities. Rajiv Gandhi also needed a bold foreign policy initiative to distract people from his party's crushing humiliation in an important election in the state of Haryana in June, 1987.

This ambiguous mixture of humanitarian and partisan concerns invites a more balanced judgment. So does India's record in Sri Lanka since 1987. Its forces have been drawn into an extreme and unsavory counterinsurgency, but this conflict was forced on them by the brutal actions of Tamil militants. Indian pressure for something like a

federal system in Sri Lanka will probably not bear fruit—mainly because Sri Lanka is unwilling to devolve substantial power to Tamil regions—but it introduced a measure of promise into what had been and has now again become a nearly hopeless situation.*

The other two episodes—the Maldives and Nepal—are more straightforward, but they point in opposite directions. New Delhi sent troops to the Maldives at the request of the government there to thwart a coup attempt led by foreign mercenaries. That is hardly an example of aggression—indeed, any previous Indian government would have done the same. The quarrel with Nepal owes something to legitimate concerns in New Delhi about Nepal's relations with China and about the smuggling into India of consumer goods flown into Nepal to escape Indian duty. But it is the clearest sign yet of the influence of the hawkish lobby that has unwisely cast India in the role of an insensitive Goliath leaning unfairly on a tiny neighbor.

The problems that have assailed Rajiv Gandhi's assertive foreign policy suggest that it may be harder to succeed with assertiveness than with Nehru's nonaligned posture. An assertive policy, unlike nonalignment, will at least occasionally impinge harshly on someone else. Allegations of Indian aggression are bound to arise, and many people will believe them—rightly or wrongly. The main complaints against Jawaharlal Nehru's nonalignment was that it was too idealistic, a charge that does not usually earn a bad press.

Second, assertiveness can be exercised only in specific encounters with other nations, whereas nonalignment was very much a global, non-specific policy. Rajiv Gandhi's countrymen therefore expect specific gains from his hawkish approach, and since these have been in short supply, he has trouble persuading them that he has achieved great things. Nehru never had this problem, even when nonalignment failed to yield dividends. Its failures were so unspecific that they were hard to identify, and Nehru could always claim—vaguely but irrefutably—that global tensions had been eased. Rajiv Gandhi may have been unwise, at least in domestic terms, to change strategy.

The immensely important and potentially violent relationship between India and Pakistan has fluctuated sharply in recent years. Tension ran high until the death of Pakistan's President Mohammad

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⁶*The Economist* (London), April 15, 1989.

*For details on the situation in Sri Lanka, see Robert Oberst's article in this issue.

"Unlike her father, Benazir Bhutto has had to be sensitive to the concerns of a constitutionally strong President and a respected military leadership. . . . Even if she wanted to become an autocrat, the current configuration of power in Pakistan would probably thwart her ambitions."

Pakistan under Benazir Bhutto

BY WILLIAM L. RICHTER

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DURING the last half of 1988, Pakistan experienced the dramatic end of one era in its turbulent political history and the cautious beginning of another. The death of President Mohammad Zia ul-Haq in a mysterious air crash on August 17, 1988, abruptly terminated his domination of Pakistan's political life and made possible much freer elections than anyone had anticipated. Those elections, held in mid-November, and the resultant appointment in December of Benazir Bhutto as Prime Minister ended a decade of struggle and political change. At age 35, Benazir Bhutto became Pakistan's youngest Prime Minister and the first woman to hold that position. Indeed, she is the first woman Prime Minister of any modern Muslim nation.

One day after her appointment, Bhutto addressed the people of Pakistan via nationwide television. Prominently displayed on the wall behind her was a photograph of her father, the late Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who had served as President (1971-1973) and Prime Minister (1973-1977) of Pakistan. The picture of the elder Bhutto was obviously intended as a symbolic link with that earlier era and with the leader whom Zia had overthrown and executed.¹

The new Bhutto era, however, is not simply a restoration of the earlier one. Benazir Bhutto is by no means a carbon copy of her father, and the circumstances she faces are different in significant respects from those that prevailed in the early 1970's. She has inherited a large array of political, economic and foreign policy changes, including a continuing civil war in neighboring Afghanistan and a formidable domestic opposition. Nonetheless, she appears to be providing Pakistan with the leadership it needs; she is avoiding the most obvious pitfalls and is now building the foundation for a

more enduring democratic political system.

Benazir Bhutto's path to power has not been easy. She returned to Pakistan from overseas study in June, 1977, two weeks before her father's downfall. She had spent four years at Harvard University (Radcliffe College), graduating cum laude in government in 1973, and then had taken a degree in politics, philosophy and economics at Oxford University. While there, she pursued a foreign service training program and served as president of the Oxford Union debating society, the first Asian woman to do so.

Her plans to enter Pakistan's foreign service were radically changed with her father's overthrow. During her father's imprisonment and after his execution, Benazir and her mother, Begum Nusrat Bhutto, assumed the leadership of the Pakistan People's party (PPP). Throughout the period of Zia's rule, the PPP pressed for the restoration of the 1973 constitution and the reestablishment of democratic political parties and representative institutions. Many PPP workers suffered imprisonment, flogging and death at the hands of the military rulers. During much of this period, Bhutto herself was imprisoned or held under house arrest. In 1984, she was released and allowed to go into exile, in part for medical reasons.

General Zia's more than 11 years of rule in Pakistan—the longest of any individual—may be regarded as comprising three broad phases. During the first phase, from the 1977 coup until November, 1979, Zia attempted twice to hold elections that would produce an "acceptable" government, that is, one that would be adequately pro-Islam and pro-military. In both instances (October, 1977, and November, 1979), Zia canceled the elections when it became obvious that the Bhuttos and the PPP still retained popular support. During the second phase, Zia imposed harsh military rule, radically altered the constitution, introduced Islamic reforms and experimented with a variety of alternative political options, including the creation of a 300-member appointed *Majlis-i-Shura* (consultative assembly)

The third phase of Zia's rule featured processes of

¹Zia, then serving as Army Chief of Staff, led the military coup that deposed Zulfikar Ali Bhutto on July 5, 1977. He promised to hold new elections and restore democracy "within 90 days," but subsequently canceled the elections and had Bhutto brought to trial for complicity in a murder. Following Bhutto's conviction, upheld by a split decision of the Supreme Court, Zia refused widespread appeals for clemency; Bhutto was executed on April 4, 1979.

civilianization and democratization. In August, 1983, Zia announced a program of gradual restoration of representative democratic institutions, with provincial, parliamentary and presidential elections to be held before March, 1985. He failed to hold the presidential elections, substituting instead a misleading plebiscite on his Islamization policies, which he then interpreted as a mandate to stay in power until 1990.

The national and provincial elections were held in February, 1985. Since political parties were still prohibited, the PPP and other anti-Zia groups chose to boycott both the 1984 plebiscite and the 1985 elections. Despite this boycott, the elections served as an effective basis on which to establish a civilian government, with veteran Sindhi Muslim League politician Mohammad Khan Junejo as Prime Minister.

Junejo was not regarded as a forceful leader, but in the months that followed he managed to make several advances in the direction of a more democratic political system. Most notably, martial law was formally lifted on December 30, 1985, and shortly thereafter political parties were again allowed to operate legally and openly.

Three months later, in April, 1986, Benazir Bhutto returned from exile. She toured Pakistan and was greeted by tumultuous crowds. She led the PPP in a series of protest movements calling for new elections. Ultimately, Prime Minister Junejo and President Zia withstood her demands. Bhutto was jailed again for a few weeks in August, after which she shifted to a less agitational strategy of rebuilding support. She was also married, in December, 1987, to Sindhi businessman Asif Zardari. The arranged marriage and the subsequent birth of a son proved to be politically astute.

THE 1988 ELECTIONS

On May 29, 1988, just as Prime Minister Junejo returned from a tour of several East Asian countries, President Zia summarily announced that he was dismissing the Junejo government, dissolving Parliament and the provincial assemblies, and calling for new elections. The ostensible reasons for these abrupt actions included Junejo's alleged failure to check corruption or to enact new Islamic

²The air crash that took Zia's life also killed United States Ambassador Arnold Raphel and United States Military Attaché Herbert Wassom, as well as top-ranking Pakistani military officers. Investigation of the crash by Pakistani and American experts was not conclusive. There appears to have been sabotage, using an explosive canister of gas smuggled aboard the flight, but by whom and at whose orders remain highly speculative questions.

³The IJI is sometimes designated IDA in the English-language press. See Rasual B. Rais, "Pakistan in 1988: From Command to Conciliation Politics," *Asian Survey*, vol. 29, no. 2 (February, 1989), p. 202.

reform legislation; but other reasons appeared more plausible, including the Prime Minister's increasing assertion of his authority over military matters and foreign policy.

General Zia waited for several weeks to set the date for the elections. He was widely regarded as having chosen November 16 on the mistaken calculation that the date would roughly coincide with the birth of Bhutto's child. In any case, the child was born in September and Bhutto was back on the campaign trail by early October.

Zia's abrupt removal from the scene brought brief uncertainty as to whether elections would be held. Senate President Ghulam Ishaq Khan became Acting President of Pakistan, in accordance with existing constitutional provisions, and reaffirmed the fact that elections would take place as scheduled. His decision was given strong public support by the new Army chief, General Mirza Aslam Beg.²

Zia had indicated earlier that the November elections would be held on a nonpartisan basis, like those of 1985. On August 17, just hours before the fatal air crash that killed Zia, Benazir Bhutto filed a court petition to allow political parties to participate. Acting President Ishaq agreed to abide by the court's decision, which ultimately came down in favor of partisan elections.

Throughout the last half of the martial law period, the PPP had functioned as a major component of the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD). Formed in 1981, the MRD had fought for an end to martial law and the restoration of the 1973 constitution. After Bhutto's return to Pakistan in 1986, the PPP increasingly went its own way and the MRD disintegrated. In anticipation of the elections, new political alliances were made and unmade. The PPP fought the elections alone, but agreed not to field candidates against the leaders of its former MRD allies. Recognizing the PPP as the strongest single contender, another nine-party alliance was created, the Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI, the Islamic Democratic Alliance).³ Within the IJI, however, there was considerable factionalism. Its largest component, the Pakistan Muslim League (PML), split temporarily between a group led by former Prime Minister Junejo and another led by the chief ministers of Punjab and the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP).

Although there were charges of malpractice, the elections were regarded as among the fairest in Pakistan's history. The major complaint, raised by the PPP, was the requirement of voter identity cards, an eleventh-hour requirement that was seen as disfranchising the PPP's poor, rural and female supporters.

Despite this impediment, the PPP emerged as the largest party nationally, with 93 of the 205 contested Muslim seats in the National Assembly to the IJI's 55. The third largest national winner, with 13 seats, was the Muhajir Qaumi Movement (MQM), a regional-ethnic party representing the Urdu-speaking people of urban Sind (i.e., Karachi and Hyderabad), most of whose families had immigrated from India at partition in 1947. The remaining seats were divided among smaller parties and independents.⁴

In order to establish a majority, the PPP forged a coalition with the MQM, based on a 55-point agreement formulated after the elections. Despite her success in the elections and in the post-election maneuvering for allies, Benazir Bhutto was forced to wait two weeks before being named Prime Minister on December 1. Meanwhile, Acting President Ishaq conducted extensive discussions with political leaders to consider alternative government combinations.

The provincial elections, held on November 19, yielded more mixed results. The PPP won in Sind, but ran second to the IJI in Punjab and the NWFP and secured only 3 seats out of 40 in the Baluchistan Assembly. The PPP suffered the most serious losses in Punjab, Pakistan's largest province. There, the PPP's 94 seats were surpassed by the IJI's 108, out of a total of 240. Both parties attempted to form coalitions, but the IJI was more successful, and Mian Nawaz Sharif was named chief minister. He thereby became Benazir Bhutto's most formidable political opponent; subsequent months brought several instances of confrontation between the two. For the first time in its history, Pakistan has different parties ruling in Islamabad and in Lahore, Punjab's provincial capital. In the NWFP, the PPP was more successful, forming a coalition government with Khan Abdul Wali Khan's Awami National party (ANP) to place PPP leader Aftab Sherpao in the chief ministership.

BHUTTO IN OFFICE

During her first year in office, Benazir Bhutto cautiously attempted to parlay her somewhat precarious position into a position of greater power and authority, and to address the political, social and economic problems she inherited after 11 years of Zia's domination. In her inaugural address to the nation, delivered in Urdu over nationwide television on December 2, she announced the release of political prisoners and the abolition of the National Press Trust, the government agency that had been

regarded as a tool of authoritarian control over the media. Among her political appointments were, surprisingly, some holdovers from the Zia period, most notably Foreign Minister Sahabzada Yaqub Khan. Ghulam Ishaq Khan, who had served as Zia's economic adviser and finance minister, was elected to a full term as President with Benazir Bhutto's endorsement. Despite criticism from leftist members of her own party, Bhutto's actions provided a *modus vivendi* with the bureaucracy and the military; therefore there was a degree of continuity and stability as the new government addressed its challenges.

Benazir Bhutto's first year as Prime Minister has not been easy. She has had to fend off well-entrenched political antagonists led by Punjab Chief Minister Mian Nawaz Sharif, while at the same time attempting to manage precarious national and provincial coalitions. All the while, Bhutto's powers have been circumscribed by a President wary of her intentions and by recalcitrant bureaucrats resentful of the PPP politicians who have become their new bosses.

Bhutto's relationship with Sharif has been especially volatile. After some initial threats and skirmishes, the two arrived at a temporary truce in late December, 1988. Later, however, the Prime Minister attempted to transfer the chief secretary of Punjab, the top bureaucratic official in the province; Sharif and the IJI kept political pressure on central interference in provincial affairs. Meanwhile, Sharif and the IJI kept political pressure on Bhutto in Islamabad and in the other provinces. In mid-1989, the IJI-led Combined Opposition party (COP) was created in the National Assembly, with Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi as its leader. Though comprising seemingly incompatible components like the rightist Jamaat-i-Islami and the leftist Awami National party, the COP shared an interest in keeping the Prime Minister in check.

In the NWFP, the Awami National party, led by Wali Khan and Begum Naseem Wali Khan, split with the PPP-led provincial government, but Chief Minister Aftab Sherpao maintained enough support among provincial assembly members to stay in power. Nawaz Sharif wooed the MQM in Sind and the ruling Baluchistan National Alliance (BNA) in Baluchistan. BNA Chief Minister Nawab Akbar Bugti, however, refused to support the IJI against the PPP. As the government of Benazir Bhutto neared the end of its first year, many opposition groups, with the obvious exception of the IJI, were apparently content to weaken the PPP government, not necessarily to replace it.

Bhutto's relations with President Ishaq have apparently been conditioned by a tacit understanding between the two at the time of her appointment as

⁴For a brief report on the national and provincial elections, including discussion of the fairness issue, see *Pakistan Elections: Foundation for Democracy* (Washington, D.C.: National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, 1989).

Prime Minister. That understanding is generally perceived to have included a promise by the Prime Minister not to interfere with Pakistan's military interests or with the broad thrust of Pakistani foreign policy. Whatever the nature and extent of such agreements, Bhutto has made several attempts to increase the power of her office, the most direct of which was an unsuccessful movement to repeal the controversial Eighth Amendment to the constitution, introduced under Zia to give greater powers to the President. Later, she removed General Hamid Gul from the highly sensitive post of chief of the Inter-Services Intelligence directorate (ISI), a position he had held under Zia. Although the move was criticized by people in both the military and the opposition, it did not lead to any major reaction.

When the Prime Minister announced in early August, however, that Admiral Iftikhar Ahmed Sirohey, chairman of the joint chiefs of staff committee, would be retired August 14 at the end of his term as admiral, President Ishaq responded with a public announcement that only the President had the authority to appoint the service chiefs. Ultimately, the President, the Prime Minister and Army Chief Aslam Beg arrived at a compromise; Admiral Sirohey would be retired (as Bhutto had announced), but his successor would be appointed by Ishaq.⁵ Although the issue blew over fairly quickly, at least temporarily it created the appearance of a constitutional crisis, with rumors of a possible military coup, Bhutto's resignation or some other dramatic action.

Many of the disputes that have arisen during the first year of Benazir Bhutto's government may be seen as a legacy of General Zia's decade of domination. It was Zia who pressed for the enactment of the Eighth Amendment to the constitution, strengthening the position of the President vis-à-vis the Prime Minister. It was during the Zia decade that Nawaz Sharif gained experience, prominence and power, and his PML built its political base. In other respects, however, Bhutto's political troubles have deeper historical roots. Her father's own record of authoritarianism and his penchant for abusing his political enemies left many opposition politicians wary of giving his daughter too much power.

From a still longer perspective, however, Pakistan under Benazir Bhutto is only undergoing a political transformation that many other countries have encountered earlier in their period of in-

⁵These developments are covered in Zaffar Abbas, "Who's in Charge?" and Makhdoom Ali Khan, "Constitutionally Speaking . . .," both in *The Herald* (Karachi), vol. 20, no. 9 (September, 1989), pp. 53-61 and 64-70, respectively.

⁶President Ghulam Ishaq Khan and former World Bank official Mahbubul Haq were two of the key economic bureaucrats during this period.

dependence. In Pakistan, power has seldom been shared among top leaders; rather, it has been concentrated in the hands of the Governor General, the President or the Prime Minister. Similarly, whoever held power in Pakistan's central government also controlled the provinces, particularly Punjab. Thus, disputes in the past year over the Eighth Amendment, military and provincial appointments, and the relative authority of the Prime Minister, the President and the Chief Ministers represent a working out of power-sharing arrangements for which the country has virtually no precedent. Given this circumstance, it is remarkable that such disputes have not been more disruptive and that workable solutions have been found for each crisis as it has arisen. Nonetheless, the situation continues to remain unpredictable.

THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AGENDA

Benazir Bhutto and her government inherited a mixed economic legacy from President Zia. On the one hand, Pakistan has enjoyed remarkable economic growth since 1977, averaging an annual growth rate of six percent per capita in real income. On the other hand, important economic disparities and a heavy burden of foreign debt remain.

Pakistan's impressive growth is attributable to a variety of factors, most notably the professional management of the economy by experienced civil servants during the martial law period, and sizable foreign inputs in the form of remittances from overseas workers and from foreign assistance.⁶

To varying degrees, each of these factors has become somewhat more tenuous just as the new democratic order has begun. In some respects, the timing is coincidental. Throughout most of the past decade, worker remittances from the Middle East have constituted the largest single component of Pakistan's foreign exchange earnings, but the end of the oil boom in the Persian Gulf has led to a leveling-off, and then a drop, in remittances to Pakistan.

The threat to future foreign assistance has thus far proved to be more imagined than real. Much of Pakistan's foreign aid over the past decade has been related to the war in Afghanistan. Assistance from the United States alone has been around US\$5 billion since 1982, making Pakistan the third largest recipient of United States aid in the 1980's. Many Pakistanis feared that the end of the Afghan war might lead to a rapid decline in American interest in Pakistan, given the traditional fickleness of

(Continued on page 449)

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In 1989, "Bangladesh is still in the early stages of political development; it has severe limitations in economic development; and it is restricted in social development by the instability of its political system and the weakness of its economy."

The Struggle for Development in Bangladesh

BY CRAIG BAXTER

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At a press conference in Washington, D.C., in April, 1989, Bangladeshi Prime Minister Moudud Ahmad said that the only technical assistance Bangladesh could offer other countries was crisis management in the handling of natural and man-made disasters. Such misfortunes frequently afflict Bangladesh, which is often described as the world's "largest, poorest country."¹ The Prime Minister's remark was based on Bangladesh's creditable handling of the calamitous floods of 1988 and the subsequent crises, including cyclones and rail accidents.

It often seems to a Western reader that Bangladesh appears in the media only when some disaster occurs. This was true even when the area now known as Bangladesh was called East Pakistan; for example, the serious cyclone and flooding of 1970, which was followed by the 1971 civil and international war that led to Bangladeshi independence in December, 1971. Additionally, the sympathy for the Bangladeshis that rose out of that war has been dissipated. Other events, like the November, 1987, riots led by the opposition parties against the regime of President Hussain Muhammed Ershad, or the 1988 floods, are equally troublesome but command short-lived attention.

For its part, Bangladesh has failed to cultivate the constituencies in the West (and especially in the United States) that supported the independence movement in 1971. Compared with India and Pakistan in the South Asian region, Bangladesh receives scant attention from the academic community. In its almost 18 years of independence, Bangladesh has failed to develop significantly in the political, economic or social areas.

This is not the place to recount the political history of independent Bangladesh.² It must be

noted, however, that the country that began under a typically constituted parliamentary regime (under the constitution of 1972, which, considerably amended, continues to be the basic document) was under civilian authoritarian rule by early 1975. Sheik Mujibur Rahman (Mujib), Bangladesh's first Prime Minister, had used the overwhelming majority of his Awami League to transform Bangladesh into a presidential, one-party system.

His assassination in August, 1975, ended Mujibist authoritarianism, but it ushered in a period of domination by Major General Ziaur Rahman (Zia) that began in November, 1975. Although martial law was declared, Zia gradually liberalized the political system. He was elected President in an election in June, 1978; the following February, relatively free elections for Parliament were held and the Bangladesh Nationalist party (BNP) created by Zia gained a clear majority. The Zia period saw improvement in economic performance, especially in the production of food grains, although Bangladesh still had food shortages.

Zia was assassinated in Chittagong on May 30, 1981, by a group led by a disgruntled major general. The country, however, followed the constitutional path; Vice President Abdus Sattar became Acting President until an election could be held. This occurred in November, 1981, when Sattar was elected to a five-year term, defeating Kamal Hossain, the nominee of the Awami League, who had been Mujib's foreign minister. Inefficiency and corruption have been hallmarks of Bangladeshi administrations and Sattar's rule was no exception. Further, Sattar was faced with the increasing insistence of the military (led by Ershad) for a defined, constitutional role in the government.

On March 24, 1982, Ershad led a bloodless coup that displaced President Sattar and began a new period of martial law with Ershad as the chief martial law administrator (he assumed the presidency on December 11, 1983). Many Bangladeshis regarded Ershad as a usurper. His critics included the Awami League, led by Mujib's daughter, Sheik Husina Wajid, and the BNP, soon to be led by Begum Khalida Zia, Zia's widow. These two

¹Bangladesh is neither the "largest" in size or in population, and not the "poorest" in terms of per capita GNP (gross national product). Ethiopia, Chad, Bhutan and Zaire rank below Bangladesh in per capita GNP for 1987, according to *World Development Report, 1989* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 164.

²For a brief description of Bangladeshi politics through the early years of the Ershad period see Craig Baxter, *Bangladesh: A New Nation in an Old Setting* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984).

women continue to lead the opposition to Ershad.

The opposition, however, agrees on only one issue: the removal of Ershad and his system. Sheik Husina wants to restore the parliamentary system Mujib installed when Bangladesh became independent; she specifically disavows any desire to reinstate the authoritarian measures Mujib took in 1975. Begum Zia, on the other hand, hopes for the restoration of the liberal presidential system of her late husband, a plan some have called (with considerable justification) the Ershad system without Ershad.

The Awami League, the BNP and many smaller opposition groups combined forces on one point (i.e., the ousting of Ershad and his associates) in November, 1987. The demonstrations effectively shut down the capital city, Dacca, for several days, before the army and the police restored order. Since that time, the two leaders and their parties have disagreed on a broader program that might lead to Ershad's departure.

Ershad's coup in 1982 introduced another period of martial law that continued until 1986. In assuming power, Ershad blamed the previous regime for inefficiency, corruption and a collapsing economy; he pledged to correct these problems and to restore democracy to Bangladesh. Ershad's first Cabinet was made up mainly of technicians, and it accomplished tasks that a government responsible to a Parliament would have found difficult. Notable among its accomplishments was the curtailing of a food rationing system that entailed high subsidies for urban dwellers, some of whom were already among the better-paid workers.

Returning Bangladesh to representative government seemed to most observers to have a low priority on Ershad's list. Like Zia before him, Ershad negotiated with opposition groups in an attempt to find an acceptable framework for an election. The opposition insisted, and Ershad eventually agreed, that the parliamentary election should be held before the presidential election. The opposition wanted to avoid a situation in which Ershad's coat-tails as an elected President would draw voters to his newly formed Jatiya party (JP).

THE 1986 ELECTION

The Awami League eventually agreed to participate in the parliamentary election held in May, 1986. This agreement permitted Ershad to present the election as free and fairly contested to outside observers, especially critics in the United States Congress, who were interested in Bangladesh as a major recipient of American assistance. The BNP, however, refused to take part; Begum Zia continued to insist that free elections are not possible if Ershad is head of the government.

The election was anything but a model. The opposition, as well as foreign observers, maintained that the government had rigged the returns. The leader of the Awami League, Sheik Husina, denounced this alleged rigging, but told this author in the summer of 1986 that the Awami League had used the same tactics in areas where it had strength. The results were unusual, considering charges of government-sponsored rigging; the Jatiya party barely crept to a majority. The Awami League was the largest opposition party. And, of course, the noncontesting BNP was absent from Parliament.

Like President Mohammad Zia ul-Haq in Pakistan the previous year, Ershad insisted that an indemnity bill had to be passed by the new Parliament before he surrendered his hold on martial law. The bill validated all actions taken under martial law and prevented recourse to the courts to reverse decisions taken during that period. The Awami League boycotted the sessions in which this bill was considered and passed.

A presidential election was held in October, and Ershad began a five-year term as an elected President. Martial law was ended in November, 1986. After all this, the Awami League, which had boycotted the presidential poll, entered Parliament, and Sheik Husina took office as the official leader of the opposition, a post she held until Parliament was dissolved as a result of the November, 1987, demonstrations. In 1986, she and her party were apparently willing to try to work with a system with which they disagreed until they had the strength to change it.

The 1987 demonstrations, however, showed that the Awami League had become disillusioned by the system, which was apparently impervious to change and barred the League from playing what it considered to be a constructive opposition role. Ershad's attempt (later voided) to include appointed military personnel on local governing bodies was the last straw. The Awami League subsequently joined the BNP and other parties in an effort to oust Ershad.

In addition to treating the 1987 demonstrations as a law-and-order problem, Ershad dissolved Parliament and called for new elections, held in March, 1988. In these elections the Awami League joined the BNP in a boycott. Because of the boycott, no significant opposition party contested, and the Jatiya party won an overwhelming majority of the seats in the Parliament. President Ershad replaced Mizanur Rahman Chowdhury, the Prime Minister of the previous Parliament, with Moudud Ahmad, who had been a minister in the Chowdhury Cabinet.

In 1984, the Ershad regime had rearranged the system of local government. The country had been

divided into 19 administrative districts, each of which had an average population of more than five million people. Ershad rightly decided that these units were too large to serve the population well either in administrative or in development matters. The previous subunits (called "subdivisions") were upgraded to the status of district; there are now 64 districts with an average population of less than two million.

The new arrangement went further, delegating considerable development planning authority to an even lower tier, the *upazilla* (literally, subdistrict). There are 460 of these subdistricts averaging about 250,000 people each. Available funds, principally from central government allocations, can be spent on development programs in several categories, e.g., education, transportation, agriculture, within certain limitations. It is too early to determine how the new system will work, but it could, if operated efficiently, provide a stimulus for microlevel development. Through patronage, it could provide a support base for Ershad and the Jatiya party; some critics maintain that this is the real purpose behind the change. (It was to the *upazilla* councils and lower bodies that Ershad proposed to attach military members, a major event contributing to the November, 1987, demonstrations.)

The first Ershad Parliament passed an amendment to the constitution that established Islam as the state religion. There were apparently several reasons for this. Although Mujib had declared Bangladesh to be a secular state, there has been concern in the Zia and Ershad periods that there might be an upsurge of Islamic fundamentalism and that this danger could be averted by a watering-down of Mujib's secularism. Zia reformulated constitutional secularism by adding a clause providing that Muslims would be allowed to conduct their lives in accordance with the Koran and the Sunna.

Zia's action and Ershad's further move were also regarded as attempts to please the fundamentalist Arab governments that were major contributors of economic assistance to Bangladesh. The second reason may have some validity, but there is little evidence of Islamic fundamentalism in Bangladesh, where most Bengali Muslims seem to consider Islam a personal matter, not to be regulated by the state. Fundamentalist candidates have performed poorly in elections both in East Pakistan and, later, in Bangladesh.

However, it is important to note that although Islam has been designated the state religion, Bangladesh has not been proclaimed as an Islamic state. It is not clear what official changes will eventually result. It is, of course, possible that this could be a step along a path that would eventually lead to an Islamic state but, given the present climate in

Bangladesh, this seems unlikely. Nonetheless, the designation has had a psychological effect on Bangladesh's Hindu, Christian and Buddhist minorities, who feel that their religions have been downgraded.

The current (and second) Ershad Parliament has amended the constitution with respect to the office of the Vice President. Previously, the Vice President was appointed by the President and served at his will. The Vice President became Acting President if the office became vacant or if the President was incapacitated. An election for a new President would be held within 180 days and the person elected would begin a new five-year term.

Under the new arrangement, the Vice President will be elected at the same time and as a running mate of the President (the next election is scheduled to be held in 1991). In the event of a vacancy, the Vice President would become President and serve the remainder of the term, as in the United States. The amendment will permit the President to appoint a Vice President in the interim until 1991. Ershad chose Prime Minister Moudud Ahmad for that post in August, 1989. Kazi Zafar Ahmad, who had been a Deputy Prime Minister, replaced Moudud Ahmad as Prime Minister.

Unlike other major countries in South Asia, Bangladesh is almost a unilingual state. Thus Bangladesh does not face the linguistic problems (often coupled with religious differences) that plague India in the Punjab, Pakistan in Sind and Sri Lanka in the north.

Nonetheless, there is one long-standing and frequently violent conflict, involving the tribes (mostly Buddhist or animist) in the Chittagong Hill Tracts in the southeastern corner of the country. During the summer of 1989, Ershad's government took steps to answer some tribal grievances. Greater powers in development matters were given to the *upazilla* councils there, and new elections were held in which tribal members were guaranteed a larger share of the seats. The result cannot yet be predicted, and violence has continued, but at what appears (according to Bangladeshi press reports) to be a lower level. The steps, however, do not answer the principal tribal complaint, the movement of "flatlanders" into tribal territory in violation of settlement rules from the British colonial period.

RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES

This problem and the much broader question of representative government in Bangladesh have drawn the attention of the United States Congress, particularly Representative Stephen Solarz (D., N.Y.), who is the chairman of the Asia and Pacific subcommittee of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Although Solarz's interest in Bangladesh

(and his interest in human rights) predates the Ershad period, he became especially active after the "irregular" parliamentary and presidential elections of 1986, when he introduced an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act entitled "Democracy in Bangladesh."³

The Solarz amendment would require that "in determining whether to provide economic assistance to Bangladesh and in determining how much assistance to provide, the President shall take into account" five specific measures of progress toward democracy. These five measures may be summarized: a credible electoral process reflecting the people's will; an effective Parliament in which both government and opposition can contribute; a free press; effective elected governments at local levels; and an independent judiciary. The amendment was passed by the United States House of Representatives, but it was eliminated in the Senate-House conference on the bill. The amendment is pending at this writing.

On April 14, 1988, Solarz held hearings on his amendment, at which this author was one of the witnesses. By this time, the March, 1988, parliamentary poll had been held in Bangladesh and, as already noted, all significant opposition groups had boycotted the election. Several representatives of the Awami League and the BNP had visited the United States before the hearing and had met Solarz and others in Congress to voice their views on the Bangladeshi political system. These representatives, together with some expatriate Bangladeshis in the United States, often echoed the views of Sheik Husina and Begum Zia that free elections could not be held with Ershad as President because the vote would be rigged; therefore, they maintained, an interim government must be set up to conduct a free election. Precisely how this interim government would be created was not clear, and their rather vague ideas showed the divergence between the two opposition groups. The witnesses supported the concepts in the Solarz amendment regarding economic assistance.⁴

A witness from the United States Department of State said,

we believe that the absence of the politically significant opposition parties at the March 3 polls made it

³United States Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *The Prospects for Democracy in Bangladesh*, 100th Congress, 2d session (April 14, 1988).

⁴Other public witnesses were A.M.A. Muhith, former finance minister under Ershad, and Zillur R. Khan, University of Wisconsin-Oshkosh.

⁵*The Prospects for Democracy*, p. 94.

⁶See, for example, *Dacca Courier*, vol. 5, nos. 48, 49 (July 10-20, 1989).

⁷See *Dacca Courier*, vol. 5, no. 29 (February 24-March 2, 1989), and vol. 5, no. 45 (June 16-22, 1989).

impossible for the elections to reflect accurately the will of the people of Bangladesh.⁵

But there is an inherent problem in stating that the elections are "not reflective," because the opposition did not contest the vote. In both East Pakistan and Bangladesh, political parties have historically announced boycotts of elections in which their chances of success were minimal at best; then they later claimed that the election was unfair. In fact, as one witness pointed out, tinkering with elections is a well-established Bengali practice no matter who is in office; witness the results of the 1973 poll in which the Awami League under Mujibur Rahman won in a rout.

Ershad addressed this problem when he said openly that the election of March, 1988, did not reflect public opinion, and he appointed a new election commissioner to revamp the electoral system. Ershad even asked the opposition parties to submit their proposals to the commissioner. There was no response.

Since the election, there has been little activity on the part of the opposition parties. An occasional demonstration has been held, and countless statements have been given to the press. The leaders of the Awami League are apparently demoralized and confidence in the leadership of Sheik Husina is declining. The BNP displays even more disarray. Several key leaders have deserted Begum Zia, primarily because parties are organized to contest elections and she has kept her party out of the last two elections. The disarray has led to a split in the party, with more experienced politicians opposed to Begum Zia, who had no political experience before her husband's death.

Nonetheless, the press continues to see the likelihood of an election soon.⁶ The role of Representative Solarz is often highlighted, while there is little criticism of what might be fairly called his intervention in the domestic affairs of Bangladesh.⁷ Even Ershad, it appears, is not bothered by American suggestions for new elections. Ershad is apparently confident either that the opposition parties will continue to refuse to take part or that if they do take part they will be defeated—and he may be right.

INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

The regional international relations of Bangladesh necessarily center on India, the country

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BOOK REVIEWS

ON SOUTH ASIA

THE SOVIET WITHDRAWAL FROM AFGHANISTAN. *Edited by Amin Saikal and William Maley.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. 177 pages and index, \$34.50, cloth; \$8.95, paper.)

The papers in this collection were written for an international symposium at the Australian National University in 1988, convened to examine various aspects of the Soviet Union's withdrawal from Afghanistan. Topics covered include the impact of the withdrawal on Afghanistan; on Soviet internal and external policy; on the Soviet military; on Southwest Asia; on Sino-Soviet relations; and on world politics. The late Louis Dupree, Leslie Holmes, Richard A. Falk, T. H. Rigby and Geoffrey Jukes are among the contributors.

Debra E. Soled

THE POLITICS OF TOURISM IN ASIA. *By Linda K. Richter.* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1989. 263 pages, index, notes and bibliography, \$24.00.)

In *The Politics of Tourism in Asia*, Linda K. Richter explores the use of tourism for promoting development and government policies, and how this objective can be mismanaged or thwarted. In most of the countries covered, tourism has been developed as if it could be isolated from the economic and political system; this alone skews the expenditure of national resources in countries where capital is often in short supply. Thus, this method of attracting foreign exchange has had a deleterious effect on the economy, using valuable resources that could otherwise be used to benefit the indigenous population. Richter concludes by suggesting some alternative strategies, beginning with the recognition that tourism is a complex social and political phenomenon whose development requires more careful integration into the political and economic system. Her thesis can easily be extended beyond Asia.

D.E.S.

NEHRU: THE MAKING OF INDIA. *By M.J. Akbar.* (New York: Viking, 1989. 609 pages, index and bibliography, \$24.95.)

Journalist and political analyst M. J. Akbar believes that understanding the philosophy of the first Indian Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, is crucial to the preservation of modern India. He writes that Nehru's greatest legacy was ending

the communalism that pitted Hindu against Muslim, and Sikh against Hindu (among others), historically dividing the Indian people. However, even after three generations of Nehru family rule, these violent divisions continue to threaten India's tranquility.

Like most privileged Indians of his era, Nehru received an aristocratic British education. Unlike many of his contemporaries, however, he was disturbed by the poverty of most Indians and determined to use his advantages to advance their cause and Indian independence. This authoritative biography uses new source material to weave together the history of modern India and the political career of the founder of the Nehru-Gandhi dynasty.

D.E.S.

J. R. JAYEWARDENE: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY. VOL. 1: THE FIRST FIFTY YEARS. *By K. M. de Silva and Howard Wriggins.* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1989. 336 pages and index, \$36.00.)

Written while J.R. Jayewardene was still in office, this biography focuses on the early career of Sri Lanka's first Executive President. Jayewardene came from a Sinhalese background, but he had an Anglo-Irish Christian upbringing, common during the colonial period. Both authors knew Jayewardene personally for at least 20 years, through the period of his participation at the highest levels of the Sri Lankan government.

From his first appearance on the national scene as a member of the national legislature in 1943 until he handed over the presidency to Ranasinghe Premadasa in 1989, Jayewardene was continuously in power, except for a short gap from 1956 to 1960. Few elected third world leaders can claim such longevity. This biography chronicles the political scene in Sri Lanka and the popular J.R.'s role until 1956.

D.E.S.

A NEW HISTORY OF INDIA. 3d edition. *By Stanley Wolpert.* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989. 493 pages, index, bibliography and glossary, \$32.50, cloth; \$14.95, paper.)

First published in 1977, this compact history of India compresses its more than 4,000-year history into brief, detailed chapters, beginning with a description of the geographic situation of the country named for the Indus River. In the development of Indian civilization India's ecological

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BANGLADESH

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comprising almost all of Bangladesh's land border (a small section abuts Myanmar). India is the dominant power in South Asia by almost any measure. India's assistance to the Bangladeshi independence struggle in 1971 was recognized, but only briefly. In many respects, Bangladesh has returned to the position held by Muslim Bengalis in the 1946 election in India, when they voted more strongly in favor of the Pakistan movement than any other group of Muslims in then united India.

There are several specific problems in the relations between India and Bangladesh. Perhaps the most important difficulty is caused by water rights in two categories: an over-abundance of water on the one hand and a water shortage on the other. The shortage concerns the construction by India of a dam on the Ganges River at Farakka, just upstream from the international boundary in India. The idea of a dam dates back to the turn of the century, when British engineers sought a means to divert Ganges water through a linkage of canals and rivers to the Hooghly River on which Calcutta is located. The diversion of water to the Hooghly decreases the normal flow through the Ganges in southwestern Bangladesh, depriving that area of sufficient water to prevent sea water intrusion and the salinization that results.

A long-term settlement has not been reached. Instead, a series of interim agreements has provided for a 50-50 division of the water at Farakka during the low-flow period in the late spring. India has proposed building a canal to link the Brahmaputra River with the Ganges, but the canal would have both its headworks and its tail in India, while the route of the canal would take some 60 miles of Bangladeshi territory. Bangladesh maintains it cannot resettle the population that would be displaced. It has countered with a plan that would include Nepal and would provide for storage dams in Nepal to regulate the flow of the northern tributaries of the Ganges. India has been reluctant to "trilateralize" what it sees as a bilateral issue.

Related to the storage dam problem is the danger Bangladesh faces from annual flooding, the worst of which came in 1988.⁸ Bangladesh proposes an integrated program for the rivers of the eastern subcontinent that would bring in India and Nepal and perhaps also Bhutan and China. The waters of the

⁸Solarz has also held hearings on the flood problem. See United States Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Disaster Relief for Bangladesh*, 100th Congress, 2d session (September 23, 1988).

⁹Biharis are Urdu-speaking refugees from northern India (often from the state of Bihar) who fled to the then East Bengal during the partition riots of 1947.

Ganges and the Brahmaputra join the waters of the Meghna River (which gains its water from the southern slopes of mountains in the Indian state of Meghalaya as well as from the mountains in north-eastern Bangladesh) that turn much of Bangladesh into a vast flooded area in the late summer. Storage dams are, of course, not a simple solution. Longer-term programs of reforestation in the mountains and dredging in Bangladeshi rivers must be part of an integrated solution.

The cost of an integrated solution and the time needed to implement it are great. And it is clear that enormous amounts of assistance would be needed from outside. Bangladeshis say that the 1960's program that provided a solution to the waters issue in the Indus basin between India and Pakistan in the western side of the subcontinent must be repeated now on the eastern side of that land mass. Unfortunately, the spurt of worldwide interest that was evidenced in the fall of 1988 seems to have dissipated.

Bangladesh believes that India is involved in the violence in the Chittagong Hill Tracts. Some leaders of the military groups have found sanctuary in the small states of northeastern India, and other tribes have gone there as refugees. Bangladesh may create conditions that will bring the refugees back and may decrease the tribal activity. Much of the border is made up of mountains and jungles, and neither India nor Bangladesh can patrol it. However, the active involvement of the Indian government seems unlikely.

India's central government has faced pressure from Assam and other states in its northeast on the question of "illegal immigrants." Economic concerns have led many Muslim Bengalis to seek employment in the northeast, a matter that predates Indian independence as well as Bangladeshi independence. The Indian government has agreed with the state governments to regard those who have arrived recently as "non-Indians," ensuring that their names are not entered on the voting lists. At one time, India planned to erect a fence along the border, but the impracticality of that plan has led to its abandonment. The maritime boundary between India and Bangladesh is also a concern.

On the other hand, Bangladesh and Pakistan often find themselves on the same side of international issues. Bangladesh has taken a stand on Afghanistan that is supportive of Pakistan's position, and both countries have been important members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference. There remain the unsolved, and probably insoluble, matters of the division of the assets and liabilities of united Pakistan and the humanitarian issue of the movement of the Biharis from Bangladesh to Pakistan.⁹

Following the initiative of Bangladesh during the Ziaur Rahman regime, the countries of South Asia (Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka) signed the implementing treaty for the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in Dacca in 1985. The agreement precludes discussion of bilateral and "political" issues at the annual summit meetings, but the presence of the nations' leaders has nonetheless permitted useful discussions. Meetings of officials below the summit level have led to agreements in developmental and technological areas.

Despite the United States "tilt" toward Pakistan in the 1971 war, relations between Bangladesh and the United States have become close, as have relations with China, while relations with the Soviet Union have tended to be cool. The Middle East is important to Bangladesh not only because of religious ties but also as a region for trade and aid, and as a place for the employment of Bangladeshi workers. The drop in oil prices has decreased the number of migrant workers, but their remittances have remained an important contribution to foreign exchange earnings, amounting to \$617 million in 1987.¹⁰ Japan has surpassed the United States as the largest bilateral aid provider.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ISSUES

It has already been noted that Bangladesh is often described as the "largest, poorest" country in the world, although this is not strictly accurate. In its early years as an independent state, Bangladesh suffered from the physical disruption of the civil war and from Mujib's economic mismanagement and the accompanying corruption. The economy was liberalized to some degree during the Zia period, and liberalism has been expanded during the Ershad administration. Steps have been taken to denationalize industry and even banking, and the government is trying to provide a more acceptable climate for foreign investors.

However, Bangladesh has been unable to attract any significant level of foreign investment. There are several reasons for this. Not the least is the endemically unstable political situation, exemplified most recently by the November, 1987, demonstrations and the closure of many industries (especially garment manufacturing) during that period. Further, Bangladesh has few natural resources that might attract foreign companies, ex-

cept for abundant natural gas. Finally, there are only a few educated Bangladeshis who might attract investors into off-shore manufacturing and assembling operations. The World Bank has stated:

Rapid industrial growth is a necessary condition for the eventual solution of Bangladesh's problems of slow GNP [gross national product] growth, mass poverty and heavy dependence on foreign investment resources.¹¹

Few would disagree with this statement, but getting from the current situation to "rapid industrial growth" is easier said than done.

Agricultural development as measured by output has been high. From about 10 million tons of food grain production in the year before independence, output has grown to the range of 17 million-18 million tons. Still, in 1987, 1.8 million tons of cereals were imported, mainly in the form of granted wheat and purchased rice. When the increase in food production is coupled with the increase in population, the per capita production of food has fallen about 5 percent between 1979-1981 and 1985-1987.¹² Average daily caloric intake is below 2,000 calories and it is estimated (without any firm statistical basis) that perhaps two-thirds of all Bangladeshis live below the poverty line.

Education, perhaps even more important than "rapid industrial growth," is a key area for development. In 1986, Bangladesh reported that 60 percent of eligible children were attending primary school (69 percent male and 50 percent female). These figures are probably exaggerated; they are probably not a measure of full-time attendance, especially at the upper grades of the primary schools. About 10 percent of the budget is allocated to education, and this is skewed toward higher education.

Bangladesh requires a large expansion of the funds utilized for vocational training to attract domestic and foreign investment in the manufacturing sector. In 1987, industry provided only 13 percent of GNP, while agriculture provided 47 percent. However, industry grew at an annual rate of 4.7 percent from 1980 to 1987, while GNP as a whole grew at 3.8 percent.

External assistance is, and will continue to be, a key to development in Bangladesh. The country has regularly disbursed more than \$1 billion in foreign assistance, with the amount reaching \$1.6 billion in 1987. Much of the assistance has been in the form of grants; thus the external debt-service ratio has not yet become a major problem. In 1987, it was about 24 percent of exports. The difficulty, however, is that there is little scope for the expansion of exports. Traditional exports like jute and tea have probably reached a plateau, if they are not already in decline. Non-traditional exports like

¹⁰ *World Development Report*, 1989, p. 198. Unless otherwise indicated, economic and other data cited below are taken from the tables in this document.

¹¹ *Bangladesh: Current Trends and Development Issues* (Washington: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, March, 1979), p. 41.

¹² *The Economist* (London), August 26, 1989, p. 81, citing unspecified World Bank data.

garments and seafood are subject to limitations through quotas (the United States has garment quotas) or restrictions on increasing supply (shellfish).

Health delivery is yet another area in which much improvement is required. For example, infant mortality is estimated (1986) at 119 per 1,000 live births, a substantial reduction from the 145 per 1,000 reported in 1965. Although Bangladesh has worked to reduce its high population growth rate, the present population of about 106 million is expected to rise to 144 million in the year 2000, even with a projected decrease in the growth rate from 2.8 percent to 2.4 percent.

Thus in 1989 Bangladesh is still in the early stages of political development; it has severe limitations in economic development; and it is restricted in social development by the instability of its political system and the weakness of its economy. Bangladesh will need the assistance of the international community for a long time to come. ■

AFGHANISTAN

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gesture to the Shia population, Najibullah reappointed Sultan Ali Keshtmand, a Hazara Parchami, to the post. He replaced six other nonparty members of the government with PDPA stalwarts and established a Supreme Defense Council, which was composed of party leaders, to administer martial law.

In the course of the next few months, Najibullah tried to effect a reconciliation with various PDPA factions; he named Army Chief of Staff Shahnawaz Tanai (a Khalqi), who had earlier been implicated in a Khalqi coup attempt, as defense minister; he released Shah Wali, the foreign minister of the late President Hafizullah Amin, from prison; and he appointed Mahmud Baryalai, former President Babrak Karmal's brother and a leading Parchami, as First Deputy Prime Minister. Najibullah continued his appeals for national reconciliation, pleading with commanders to reach peace agreements with the government and elaborating on his proposals for recognizing their local autonomy.

THE SHURA

Meanwhile, under pressure from the Americans and Pakistanis to offer a more convincing alternative to Kabul, the Peshawar Alliance held a *shura* (council) on its own to choose an "interim government." However, the *shura* that convened in Rawalpindi on February 10, 1989, failed to produce a broad-based government, and it exacerbated

rather than resolved conflicts among the mujahideen. While Iran campaigned vigorously for the maximum number of seats for the Shia, Saudi Arabia offered huge payoffs to assure that the clients of Iran, its main rival for influence in the Islamic world, would not be represented.

The *shura* and the events surrounding it intensified several conflicts within the resistance. The exclusion of the Iran-based alliance embittered relations with the Shia in Afghanistan and further turned Iran against the American- and Saudi-supported Sunni mujahideen. The choice of a Wahhabi as Prime Minister and the role of Saudi money further alienated the Shia and the Iranians, and intensified the bitter resentment many Sunni Afghans felt at what they perceived as Saudi attempts to buy their loyalty. This resentment had been intensified by events elsewhere. In Kunar, Jamil-ur-Rahman, a former commander of the Hezb-e Islami (Hekmatyar), had established a Wahhabi organization outside the framework of the seven-party alliance. He was generously funded and armed by Saudi donors, and several hundred Arab volunteers fought alongside him.

After the fall of the provincial center, Jamil-ur-Rahman founded an independent local *shura* parallel to the one founded by the commanders belonging to the Alliance parties; the Arab money he received enabled him to establish an organization powerful enough to take over the town's principal mosque, a major symbol of legitimacy. Worst of all, Jamil-ur-Rahman and his followers, especially the Arabs, argued that government- or militia-controlled areas of Afghanistan had become non-Muslim territory inhabited by apostates. When those areas were captured, they claimed, Islam required the application of the laws of *futuhat*, or conquest, which provided for the pillaging of property, the execution of men, and the enslavement of women and children. Indeed, in several areas of Kunar, the Wahhabi and other mujahideen under their influence had executed captured militia members, and raped and sold women. While Wahhabi leader Abd-ur-Rabb-ur Rasul Sayyaf was not implicated in these events, the opprobrium they generated affected his stature. The hatred of the Arabs among mujahideen increased, and armed clashes occurred.¹³

The *shura* also intensified ethnic conflict. Rabbani, the leader of the only party with a mainly non-Pashtun following, received the fewest votes and consequently he held the least important position in the "interim government." This was glaringly inconsistent with his party's position as the single most important military force in the resistance. Rabbani and his followers felt that Pakistan and the Pashtuns had conspired to squeeze them out.

¹³Edward Girardet, "Arab Extremists Exploit Afghan Jihad," *Christian Science Monitor*, February 23, 1989.

The exclusion of Zaher Shah and his supporters alienated his tribal following. On February 8, two days before the opening of the *shura*, a group including many elders and dignitaries of the Durrani tribes from Kandahar and western Afghanistan had staged a demonstration in Peshawar in favor of Zaher Shah. Club- and gun-wielding militants of the Hezb-e Islami (Hekmatyar) had broken up the demonstration, beating participants and journalists while Pakistani police looked on. The dominance of the Ghilzai in the Alliance and consequently in the interim government increased Durrani-Ghilzai tensions.¹⁴ Among the seven, the party that has the most support among the traditional tribal elites, as well as the secularized intelligentsia of the royal regime, is the National Islamic Front of Afghanistan (NIFA), led by Pir Sayyed Ahmad Gailani. The NIFA received the second smallest number of votes and was clearly out of favor with both the ISI and the Islamists.

Finally, the exiled leaders scarcely consulted the commanders. Mohammad Eshaq, a representative of Ahmad Shah Massoud and a political officer of Jamiat, was not appointed as a delegate to the *shura*, although he was in Pakistan at the time. Important commanders who did participate, like Abdul Haq, Kabul commander of Hezb-e Islami (Khales), played minor roles and left early in disgust. Once constituted, the "Afghan Interim Government" (AIG) did not engage in consultations with the commanders, nor did it offer to recognize local *shuras* as the base of a new representative and administrative structure for the Afghan state. Instead, its ministers essentially asked the commanders to fight in order to establish them—the exiled leaders—in power in Kabul. In many respects, Najibullah offered significantly more power, autonomy and aid to the commanders. It is a testament to the strength of Islamic ideology and the hatred engendered by the PDPA's record of terror and subservience to the Soviet Union that so few commanders accepted Najibullah's offers.

To gain credibility as a genuine contender for state power, the interim government had to establish itself on Afghan territory. This need led to the battle of Jalalabad, the most crucial event since the Soviet withdrawal.

¹⁴Olivier Roy, "From Victory to Defeat in Afghanistan," *Washington Post*, August 7, 1989.

¹⁵The author was told this by mujahideen at the Ghaziabad State Farm during the first week of February.

¹⁶Despite the failure of the mujahideen to take Jalalabad, Saudi Arabia recognized the AIG, as did Bahrain, Malaysia and Sudan. The AIG Foreign Minister, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, was invited to occupy Afghanistan's vacant seat in the OIC, but the OIC voted to give the seat to the "representative of the Afghan mujahideen," not the AIG as such. Neither Pakistan nor the United States have recognized the AIG.

JALALABAD

Jalalabad was an obvious target for the Peshawar Alliance. The mujahideen controlled the main highway from the Pakistani tribal territories up to the last ridge before the city, and they had captured an excellent staging area in the Ghaziabad State Farm. The proximity of Jalalabad to Peshawar and the ethnic composition of the area (mainly Ghilzai and Eastern Pashtun) made it more amenable to influence by the ISI and the Peshawar Alliance than other areas. Since the mujahideen had no general staff to plan such an operation, the ISI undertook this function, probably with the participation of some Americans as well. Since at least January, 1989, ISI officers had been entering the area to establish plans for the attack.¹⁵ Its timing was seemingly influenced by the upcoming meeting of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), which was to take place in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, on March 13–16. Apparently, the intention was to have the AIG operating in Jalalabad in time to request recognition from the OIC and its member states.¹⁶ The ISI and AIG, however, prevailed over the commanders, and the assault began on March 7, 1989.

In the event, the mujahideen overran the key government post at Samarkhel, on the last ridge before the city, and they advanced toward the airport, rendering it largely unusable for fixed-wing aircraft. The mujahideen had some success in closing the road from Kabul, forcing the regime to resupply the garrison by helicopter. The expected defections, however, did not materialize. The regime's air power and artillery inflicted heavy losses on the mujahideen (the heaviest of the war, by some reports). Government morale soared for the first time since the beginning of the Soviet withdrawal. By July, 1989, the regime was able, at least temporarily, to retake the village of Samarkhel, if not the nearby post, and to launch punitive strikes against Ghaziabad.

Many factors, military and political, contributed to the failure of the mujahideen. The interpretation most favorable to the AIG emphasized the fact that the Soviet forces had mounted an unprecedented (and unanticipated) massive supply effort, that the mujahideen had neither artillery heavy enough to attack concrete bunkers nor mine-clearing equipment, and that they were still exposed to air power against which they were vulnerable, if not defenseless. If this were the case, the answer clearly was that heavy artillery, minesweepers and more Stinger missiles were needed.

A more detailed analysis of the operation casts doubt on whether the lack of sufficient equipment and technical training was really the key problem. After all, the offensive was predicated in part on the

expectation of massive defections. It is no mystery that they did not occur. In the same sector of the war, mujahideen of the Hezb-e Islami (Khaless) had massacred the defectors from Torkham. Furthermore, Western reporters with the mujahideen during the battle of Jalalabad again saw fighters shoot government soldiers who were trying to surrender.¹⁷ Such incidents obviously increase any soldier's determination to fight, regardless of his allegiance.

The successful defense of Jalalabad boosted the credibility of Najibullah's claim that his government and party had staying power and had to be part of any political solution. The United States, whose policy toward Afghanistan has increasingly come under the control of ambassador to Pakistan Robert Oakley, remained committed, despite internal disagreements, to viewing the Afghan policy as a test case of the success of the policy of "rolling back" Soviet gains.¹⁸

As of this writing, at least publicly, all Sunni resistance leaders and the vast majority of commanders remain opposed to dealing politically with the PDPA regime, which they hold responsible for the Soviet invasion, the killing of over one million Afghans, the effective expulsion of one-third of the population (now refugees), and the devastation of their country.¹⁹ But while most of them are unwilling to recognize Najibullah's government, neither do they want to risk their lives (and those of the millions of Afghans living under government control) for the sake of the AIG. Hence, de facto truces have evolved in much of Afghanistan. The resulting stalemate works to the advantage of Kabul, given the expectation that the regime could last at most a few months after the Soviet withdrawal.

The prospects for a successful offensive decreased over the summer as conflicts among the mujahideen continued to intensify. The open violence that had often broken out between rival parties in Afghan-

istan received international coverage and created open conflict in Peshawar for the first time in late July, when a commander of Hezb-e Islami (Hekmatyar), Sayyed Jamal, killed 30 mujahideen of Jamiat in the Farkhar district of Takhar province. Five of the victims were killed in an ambush, but the remaining 25 were executed in captivity. Among those killed were several senior commanders of the Council of the North and one of the few major Uzbek commanders in the resistance, Qazi Islamuddin.²⁰ Radio communications intercepted in Peshawar showed that, while the origin of the dispute might have been local, orders for the executions came from Hekmatyar's headquarters.

Despite the determination of United States officials like Oakley to continue the policy of "rolling back" Soviet gains, the disarray of this policy began to generate a debate both inside and outside the United States government. The American special envoy to the Afghan mujahideen, Edmund F. McWilliams, who had been appointed in 1987, had consistently argued against putting too much weight on the AIG and particularly on Hekmatyar. Oakley had dissented from many of McWilliams's cables and had finally engineered his dismissal.²¹ Pressure to stop aid to Hekmatyar increased after the Takhar massacre and his withdrawal from the AIG.

In September, the United States suspended payments to the exile party offices, leaked plans to supply the commanders directly—supposedly with the help of the AIG—and renewed middle-level consultations with Zaher Shah. Furthermore, Pakistani military chief General Aslam Beg publicly stated that, if Najibullah resigned, the mujahideen should open talks with Kabul. All these signals, however, still fell short of a new policy.²²

For the moment, as one journalist put it, Afghanistan is heading "back to feudalism."²³ The commanders remain warlords in the countryside. Najibullah's government, like the precolonial empires of the region, is content to control the towns and roads, tries to strike deals with those it can and neutralize those it cannot. Neither Najibullah nor the resistance leaders, despite the weapons they have received, have enough legitimacy to reestablish even the weak state structure Afghanistan had developed before 1978. The commanders enjoy local legitimacy, but they all lead a more or less narrow segment of the society. None of them can bring the others together or form a dominant army. As long as the Soviet Union, the United States, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Iran all back their clients, Afghanistan will remain not just a fragmented society, but a fragmented society with firepower. No one prefers a civil war in Afghanistan, but it is apparently still everyone's second choice. ■

¹⁷*Newsweek*, March 27, 1989, p. 38.

¹⁸Oakley was appointed ambassador in August, 1988, after the death of Ambassador Arnold Raphel in the same airplane crash that killed President Zia.

¹⁹According to both a Washington-based American official dealing with Afghanistan and sources in Peshawar, NIFA leader Gailani sent a close relative to Kabul to speak to Najibullah in July. The author cannot verify the report and has no information on the content of the reported discussions. The Iran-based alliance has agreed in principle to hold talks with "non-Communist" members of the government, reflecting Iran's opposition to the AIG.

²⁰Roy, "From Victory to Defeat in Afghanistan."

²¹Steve Coll, "U.S. Envoy Reassigned in Afghanistan Policy Clash," *Washington Post*, August 10, 1989.

²²This article went to press before the meeting between United States Secretary of State James Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze in late September.

²³*Far Eastern Economic Review*, July 13, 1989.

INDIA

(Continued from page 432)

Zia ul-Haq in August, 1988. India rightly accused Zia of aiding Sikh terrorism in Punjab, and there was much talk in India about Rajiv Gandhi using Zia as a bogeyman in his 1989 election campaign. The rise to power of Pakistan's Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, who has a reasonably good press in India, makes it difficult for New Delhi to attribute evil designs to Pakistan.

But Rajiv Gandhi remained anxious about possible opposition accusations of being soft on Pakistan and he abandoned a deal to reduce tension on the Siachen glacier, where the two nations have waged a largely pointless conflict for years. Relations between India and China have recently thawed a little, thanks mainly to China. But with an Indian election looming, there have been severe limits on New Delhi's ability to improve ties with either China or Pakistan.

FUTURE CONCERNS

Finally, consider both the pessimists and—more briefly—the optimists, understanding that the two views are not necessarily mutually exclusive. India's future may have room for both groups.

The pessimists tend, with exceptions, to study those parts of India where economic development has lagged, where inequalities and social conflicts are marked, and where corruption and the exploitation of vulnerable groups run to such extremes that liberals easily become cynics or radicals. The pessimists anticipate the destruction of the political order—a prospect that some view with relish and some with foreboding. They can, for the sake of simplicity, be separated into two camps. The first camp foresees a sharp increase in social conflict—which open, competitive political institutions have encouraged—that will eventually tear those very institutions apart. The second camp also expects mounting conflict, but the threat to institutions comes not from that strife itself but from the use of it by civilian elites as an excuse to eliminate politics and prolong their rule.

Changing conditions outside the political sphere are likely to exacerbate the conflicts and anxieties that could lead to one of these outcomes. Three sets of changes are especially important. The first is the growth in the proportion of the rural population that is landless or land-poor. There is no clear indication at the moment of how rapidly landlessness is growing. Most scholars agree that it is on the rise, but there are widely varying estimates of its level and the rate of increase.

If higher estimates are accurate, by the turn of the century between 40 and 50 percent of all

villagers will be without land; then the agrarian socioeconomic order will become unstable. Conflicts in rural areas, which will also surface within the political system, will become far more severe and more desperate over much wider areas of the subcontinent. In these circumstances, representative institutions may find it very difficult to manage conflict adequately. It is more likely, however, that before such institutions actually break down, civilian elites will seize on social disorder as an excuse to abandon open politics, in order to maintain themselves in power.

A second set of changes also merits attention: the ecological problems that are already causing acute concern in many parts of India. Shortages of water for humans, for livestock and for irrigating land have become increasingly common. The use of industrially produced fertilizers has created soil problems. Soil erosion has caused alarm in some areas, and deforestation is a major concern in others. All these factors are likely to generate increasingly abrasive conflict in rural areas and within the political system.

These trends and the rising incidence of landlessness are rendered yet more intimidating by India's population growth rate, which will cause it to overtake China as the world's largest nation early in the twenty-first century. All this raises further doubts about the capacity of liberal political institutions to handle the situation over the next generation or two.

The optimists often study India's more prosperous regions (of which there are many). Some of them argue that a booming agricultural sector will raise the living standards of most rural dwellers, and that wealth from the countryside can be plowed into new urban industries to generate further growth there. Another politically oriented group takes heart from the abundance of skilled political managers on hand in India—in every party, in every region, at every level of the political system. Such optimists believe that if dynastic dominance ceases in New Delhi, the supply of skilled people may facilitate creative realignment of political forces and the reconstitution of coherent government at the state and national levels.

Such a realignment would almost certainly entail at least a modest decentralization of power to the states in the federal system. That would alarm many people who mistakenly fear the break-up of India but, if it had time to take root, realignment could also produce a reasonably rational, workable political system. There are many reasons why this may not occur, and if it does, it will not offer politicians or voters a tranquil life. But it is as plausible as any alternative. India's political options remain open. ■

SRI LANKA

(Continued from page 428)

that Prabhakaran had opposed cooperation with the Premadasa government and had been murdered by the supporters of increased cooperation. The death of so many Tamil leaders left a power vacuum that complicated the government's efforts to resolve the conflict. In any case, the Tamil insurrection had been displaced by the JVP insurrection as a threat to the stability of the government.

The JVP is the same organization that led a bloody insurrection against the Sri Lankan government in 1971.¹⁷ At that time, it was defeated and its leaders were arrested. (Its leader and founder, Rohana Wijeweera, was released from jail in an amnesty on November 2, 1987.) The JVP was legalized again in 1977 after the UNP came to power. This time there was an attempt to portray the JVP as the victim of a youth purge by the former SLFP Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike. The JVP became a legal political party and contested the 1982 presidential elections and the 1981 District Development Committee elections with some limited success.

In July, 1983, bloody anti-Tamil riots swept Sri Lanka. Although most evidence points to the involvement or complicity of UNP government ministers and police, the government banned the JVP and several other leftist parties, and ordered the arrest of their leaders. Wijeweera went underground and began to build his own political network. The JVP was largely quiet until the arrival of the Indian peacekeeping troops in Sri Lanka on July 29, 1987.

The JVP responded to the 1987 accords with a violent campaign against the introduction of Indian troops. They began assassinating government supporters and candidates in the provincial council, presidential and parliamentary elections held in 1988 and 1989. The assassination campaign has intensified. Although most of the victims were of little political importance, important political leaders have also been targets. On August 18, 1987, a bomb attack in Parliament during a government parliamentary group meeting was aimed at President Jayewardene. One member of Parliament was killed and ten were injured. JVP assassins have also killed the leader of the small, leftist SLMP, the president of the UNP and the former vice-chancellor of the University of Colombo.

The JVP intensified its actions during the spring of 1989 by ordering all public transport in the coun-

try to halt. To enforce the order, JVP members began killing bus drivers and conductors, and attacked several trains. The transport workers proceeded to go on strike, and buses and trains in Sri Lanka were paralyzed for much of June and July. Its success at stopping the public transport system led the JVP to begin a similar campaign aimed at medical personnel in August, resulting in the closure of hospitals.

GROWING JVP STRENGTH

The increased success of JVP actions has placed greater pressure on government security forces, which have been ineffective in controlling the JVP violence. JVP assassination teams are usually free to pick and choose their targets at will. The security force's frustration has led to the emergence of death squads. Shadowy organizations that appear to consist of off-duty police and soldiers have begun a violent campaign against suspected JVP supporters and their families. Most bodies are burned and the identity of many remain unknown.

Instead of reducing the violence, the death squads appear only to have intensified it. The JVP has become increasingly active and increasingly violent. University students who are sympathetic to the JVP have increased their demands for an accounting of students who have disappeared after being arrested by the government security forces. The universities have been unable to reopen, having been forced to close in 1987.

The JVP violence has been centered in the Southern Province districts of Hambantota and Matara. However, no part of the country has been spared. Even the districts of Kandy and Nuwara Eliya in the hill country, which were largely immune to JVP violence in 1987 and 1988, began to experience attacks in 1989.

The JVP has appealed to Sinhalese nationalism. Its main argument has been that parliamentary government under the UNP (first Jayawardene and now Premadasa) is a farce and that the UNP has damaged national sovereignty by allowing Indian troops to function in Sri Lanka.

For a time in 1989, it appeared that President Premadasa would be able to undermine the JVP's support. He was very popular in rural areas, had developed a populist image and conducted a widespread house-building campaign as minister of housing and construction during the Jayewardene government. In addition, he personally opposed the introduction of Indian troops into the country in 1987 and made his opposition known. However, the Indian government's refusal to withdraw its troops at the request of the Sri Lankan government undermined his credibility. India's refusal also led to increased support for the JVP, which continually

¹⁷For more information on the insurrection, see Robert N. Kearney and Janice Jiggins, "The Ceylon Insurrection of 1971," *The Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, vol. 13, no. 1 (March, 1975).

argued that the Indians have no plans to leave Sri Lanka.¹⁸

President Premadasa inherited serious problems that were the result of Jayewardene's mismanagement of the ethnic situation, and now he must try to solve those problems while he confronts the Indian government. Until the Indian government stops destabilizing the administration, there is little hope that Premadasa can successfully attack the problems facing Sri Lanka. In the meantime, the SLFP and other opposition parties are growing impatient with the deteriorating political situation and the inaction of the courts in responding to their charges of fraudulent elections.

Although Sri Lanka has not descended to the levels of violence found in Lebanon, the country remains at a crucial point in its history. Continuing political deterioration may accelerate the violence. However, the apparent agreement of the LTTE to negotiate its differences with the government offers some hope. The future of Sri Lanka may well lie in the hands of the Indian government, and if it continues to destabilize the Sri Lankan government, Sri Lanka may be on the road to a complete breakdown of civil rule and stability. ■

¹⁸In early September, 1989, President Premadasa announced an agreement with Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. In the agreement, India promised to remove all troops from Sri Lanka by the end of December, 1989.

PAKISTAN (Continued from page 436)

American policy. Although the continuation of the war makes it too early to tell whether these fears are valid, the administration of President George Bush has certainly given no indication that such changes are in the offing. In fact, following Benazir Bhutto's visit to Washington, D.C., in June, 1989, the United States agreed to sell an additional 60 F-16 aircraft to Pakistan, bringing the authorized total to 100.

Perhaps the greatest uncertainty is the future management of the economy, although here again it is too early to make a detailed assessment. In some respects, the bureaucracy has maintained continuity in its management of economic affairs, regardless of frequent changes in the political regime. However, the first Bhutto government

⁷W. Eric Gustafson, "A Review of the Pakistan Economy under Bhutto," in Manzooruddin Ahmed, ed., *Contemporary Pakistan: Politics, Economy and Society* (Durham, N.C.: Carolina Academic Press, 1980), pp. 146-162.

⁸Ihteshamul Haque, "Balancing Act," *The Herald*, vol. 20, no. 1 (July, 1989), p. 91.

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰Shahid Javed Burki, presentation at annual meeting of the Association for Asian Studies, Washington, D.C., March, 1989. Cf. Nasra M. Shah, *Pakistani Women: A Socioeconomic and Demographic Profile* (Honolulu: East-West Population Institute, East-West Center, 1986).

(1971-1977) undermined that continuity in several ways. Z.A. Bhutto expanded the public payroll to reward party workers and supporters, weakened the bureaucracy by introducing a system of lateral entry and frightened away capital by nationalizing several industries.⁷ Finally, the period of turmoil that followed the disputed March, 1977, elections had further harmful effects on the economy.

Benazir Bhutto appears determined not to repeat her father's economic mistakes, but she is frequently criticized for failure to move quickly enough on economic and social legislation:

Given that the budget in Pakistan is also a statement of the government's official economic policy, some of the more pertinent issues missing from the 1989-1990 budget include plans to curtail the debt-servicing burden in the future, effective strategies to foster industrial growth, reduction of unemployment and underemployment, and the absence of a long-term vision to mobilize revenues in a democratic and just manner.⁸

Repayment of interest and principal on foreign debts is likely to be on the Bhutto agenda for some time. Pakistan has one of the highest debt-service ratios in the world, and the 1989-1990 budgeted allocation for debt servicing is larger than either the Annual Development Plan or the defense budget.⁹

One controversial component of Pakistan's total foreign debt is a US\$833-million package from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The IMF deal was negotiated before Zia's death, and Bhutto reluctantly agreed to abide by its terms, which will include pressure to restructure Pakistan's economy in accordance with IMF guidelines.

World Bank economist Shahid Javed Burki has argued that Pakistan's future growth is likely to encounter difficulties unless adequate attention is paid to the distribution of economic benefits in Pakistani society. In many respects, he argues, Pakistan is a middle-income country, potentially comparable to the newly industrialized countries (NIC's) of East Asia and Southeast Asia. By certain social indices, however, it remains underdeveloped, particularly in terms of female literacy, infant mortality, infant health care and related areas.¹⁰ The Bhutto government has included sizable increases in the allocations for health and education in the 1989-1990 budget.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Just as Prime Minister Bhutto's domestic actions have been sharply circumscribed by opposing political forces, she has not had a free hand in shaping Pakistan's foreign relations. She has tried to take new initiatives with regard to India and Afghanistan, but for the most part she has continued the

policies she inherited from the previous regime.

Benazir Bhutto's victory in the November elections was greeted with great enthusiasm in neighboring India. After she became Prime Minister, she capitalized on that goodwill by meeting with Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. The two leaders jointly expressed their confidence that, as "new generation" leaders, they would find ways to reduce the long-standing enmities between their two countries. They also reached some substantive agreements, including a formal agreement not to attack one another's nuclear facilities.

In subsequent meetings, the same cordial spirit has prevailed, although symbolic gestures have largely outweighed substantive change. During a summit meeting of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in Islamabad, Bhutto paid "tribute to the memory of Mrs. Indira Gandhi," Rajiv's mother and predecessor. She abandoned the "No-War Pact" proposal that General Zia had raised in 1981, indicating instead that Pakistan would revert to the 1972 Simla Agreement as the basis for Indo-Pakistani relations. She and Foreign Minister Sahabzada Yaqub Khan offered to initiate mutually agreed-on reductions in conventional arms.¹¹

India and Pakistan had haggled over the no-war pact notion, along with an Indian counterproposal for a mutual friendship treaty, for seven years without reaching agreement; therefore, abandoning the idea was understandable, particularly given its identification with Zia. The Simla Agreement, negotiated between Indira Gandhi and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, also had obvious personal symbolism for the two Prime Ministers.¹² However, many Pakistanis see the agreement, which requires that neither country seek outside support on bilateral issues, as appeasement of India's "hegemony" in the region.

Clearly, Bhutto has made the improvement of relations with India a foreign policy priority, but any Pakistani leader is limited in the pursuit of this goal. A variety of issues between the two countries have remained intractable for several years, with no

clear solution in sight. Kashmir has remained disputed territory for four decades. During the 1980's, Indian and Pakistani troops have clashed several times over the undemarcated Siachen Glacier in northern Kashmir.

A second issue that is likely to remain troublesome is nuclear weapons capability. India exploded a nuclear device in 1974, and demonstrated its delivery capabilities in 1989 by successfully testing its Agni long-range ballistic missile. Although Pakistan has not exploded a nuclear device, such an event has been rumored for nearly a decade.¹³ India's policy of not producing nuclear weapons, despite a vocal lobby in favor of such a strategy, is coupled with active Indian attempts to deny Pakistan the nuclear option.

American foreign assistance legislation, based on long-standing nuclear nonproliferation policies, provides for the immediate cancellation of assistance to Pakistan if the latter should explode a nuclear device, or even if Pakistan can be shown to be developing nuclear capabilities. Such a cancellation took place in 1979, but during the 1980's security interests related to the Afghan war tended to overlook Pakistan's apparent development of nuclear weapons technology. India and several members of the United States Congress have continued to call for stricter American control over Pakistan's nuclear options, but an assurance from the American President each year has been sufficient to keep the aid flowing.

For several years Pakistan's stance has been that its nuclear technology is directed primarily toward the production of electrical power; that it does not intend to develop nuclear weapons; and that it is prepared to enter into regional agreements with India, including the mutual inspection of nuclear facilities, but not to concede unilaterally an option that India will not even discuss. Benazir Bhutto has reiterated this "regional solution" to the nuclear proliferation problem, which the United States now largely endorses but India rejects out of hand, citing the threat of China on its northern borders. Neither India nor Pakistan sees possession of nuclear weapons as beneficial to its national interest, but neither is prepared to abandon the nuclear option.

India's relations with its other neighbors, particularly Sri Lanka, Nepal and Bangladesh, also limit any possible improvement in Indo-Pakistani relations. India's involvement in Sri Lanka's civil war, its deployment of troops to put down a 1988 coup in the Maldives and its crippling trade pressures on Nepal in 1989 have all served to reinforce Pakistani concerns about Indian "hegemony" in the subcontinent.¹⁴ If Benazir Bhutto ignores these concerns in her attempt to build Indo-Pakistani friendship, she may risk both the goodwill of

¹¹Mushahid Hussain, "The Birth of a Superpower?" *The Herald*, vol. 20, no. 9 (September, 1989), p. 14.

¹²Benazir Bhutto, then barely 19 years old, accompanied her father to the conference at Simla, the Indian hill station that served during British times as the viceregal summer capital.

¹³Cf. Gerard C. Smith and Helena Cobban, "A Blind Eye to Nuclear Proliferation," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 68, no. 3 (Summer, 1989), pp. 57-59; and Thomas P. Thornton, "The New Phase in U.S.-Pakistani Relations," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 68, no. 3 (Summer, 1989), pp. 153-155.

¹⁴For a more general discussion of these issues, see William L. Richter, "Indira Gandhi's Neighborhood: Indian Foreign Policy Toward Neighboring Countries," in Yogendra K. Malik and Dharendra K. Vajpeyi, eds., *Indira: The Years of Indira Gandhi* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1988), pp. 118-131.

other South Asian countries and strong criticism at home.

Although India remains Pakistan's top foreign policy concern, the war in neighboring Afghanistan has occupied much of its attention for the past decade. On February 15, 1989, ten weeks after Bhutto became Prime Minister, the Soviet Union completed its withdrawal from Afghanistan, in accordance with the Geneva Accords signed in April, 1988. Despite expectations that the Marxist regime in Kabul might easily fall after the Soviet withdrawal, it has remained remarkably strong, reinforced by massive Soviet arms assistance and aided by growing factional divisions among the anti-Marxist mujahideen.

Under Benazir Bhutto, Pakistan has largely continued the policies it inherited, supporting the mujahideen and maintaining close cooperation with the United States. Continuity of its policy toward Afghanistan was one of the concessions Bhutto apparently made to ensure a peaceful political transition in late 1988.

The failure of the mujahideen forces to capture the city of Jalalabad, despite months of siege after the Soviet departure, has led to reconsideration of Pakistan's Afghan policy. The interim Afghan government in Peshawar and the United States maintain the hard-line expectation of ultimate military victory over Afghan President Najibullah's government. Benazir Bhutto has increasingly urged a more flexible response to the possibility of a negotiated settlement. She raised this issue with United States President George Bush during her visit to the United States in June, 1989; more recently she asked her country's intelligence services to carry out an extensive review of Pakistan's Afghan policy.¹⁵

CONCLUSION

The second Bhutto era in Pakistan's political history differs in many respects from the first. Although Benazir Bhutto's PPP was unable to secure a majority of seats in the November, 1988, elections, she has been able to maintain PPP governments at the national level and in two of the four provinces. She has had to deal with formidable challenges, however, including the unprecedented situation of having the largest province in the hands of the political opposition.

Unlike her father, Benazir Bhutto has had to be sensitive to the concerns of a constitutionally strong President and a respected military leadership. Whereas Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was able to act virtually as a dictator, silencing any domestic opposition he could not control, his daughter must operate

with powers more circumscribed than those of almost any other Prime Minister. Even if she wanted to become an autocrat, the current configuration of power in Pakistan would probably thwart her ambitions.

The key question is whether she has enough power to lead the country, to address its many economic, social and foreign policy issues, and to continue to build its democratic system. ■

THE UNITED STATES IN SOUTH ASIA

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tested a nuclear device. It is possible that without the new ties to the United States, Pakistan might have tested a nuclear device during this period, but this is only conjecture; even without United States assistance there would have been strong pressure against such testing.

Testing aside, Pakistan showed little restraint. It continued to expand its technical ability to produce nuclear weapons and—in apparent violation of what the United States had assumed was a commitment not to do so—began accumulating significant quantities of weapons-grade material. Support for the Pakistani nuclear program has been widespread. Developing a nuclear weapons option has been a key Pakistani security objective for some time and it is not surprising that Pakistan did not show the kind of restraint that the United States hoped for.³

In his last statement on the Pakistani nuclear program, President Reagan said that in his view it would be hard to certify Pakistani non-possession of nuclear weapons in the years ahead. It is clear that Pakistan was unwilling to stop moving toward acquiring nuclear weapons capability without a similar commitment from India.

CHANGING POLICIES

Not surprisingly, the Bush administration appears to be continuing the policies of the Reagan administration toward South Asia. In relation to Afghanistan, President George Bush inherited a success. To demonstrate continued United States support, the President received Burhanuddin Rabbani, the "spokesman" of the Afghan mujahideen alliance, in his office only two days after his election victory. Pakistan's Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi have also been received by President Bush.

However, despite continuity along broad policy

³The United States State Department had to certify to Congress every year that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear device. Because of increased concern about the developments in the Pakistani nuclear program, in December, 1987, Congress refused to grant a second six-year waiver when it approved the follow-on assistance program. Instead, it granted a two-year waiver.

¹⁵Ahmed Rashid, "Give Peace a Chance," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, August 31, 1989, p. 24.

lines, the Bush administration faces a situation that is different in significant ways from that of the Reagan years. In Afghanistan, for example, since the Soviet soldiers have left, the challenge is somewhat more complex. In late 1989, the United States objective appears to be the replacement of the government of Afghan President Najibullah with one that has the support of the Afghan people and therefore can ensure a degree of stability in Afghanistan. However, so far a strategy that can realistically achieve this objective has not emerged.

Like its predecessor, the Bush administration expected Najibullah's government to collapse soon after the Soviet withdrawal. Contrary to this expectation, Najibullah's government has not yet fallen. The administration has been groping for ways to cope with the new situation and has been sending contradictory signals. For example, after the Soviet troops withdrew, the administration made it clear that it would continue to send arms to the mujahideen until the Kabul regime was overthrown. But according to press reports, it slowed arm supplies significantly in the spring and summer of 1989—when Moscow was supplying Kabul with massive quantities of arms worth between \$250 million and \$300 million every month. The slowdown in arms to the mujahideen was probably caused by two factors: the assumption that the regime would collapse quickly and the fact that the United States did not want too many weapons in the hands of the mujahideen after their victory against Kabul. This United States action and mujahideen in-fighting resulted in a loss of valuable momentum.

At the political level, the United States hoped that the Afghan Interim Government (AIG) formed by the Pakistan-based mujahideen leaders would come to terms with the mujahideen commanders in Afghanistan and other non-Communist Afghans. So far this has not happened. In reaction, the Bush administration has apparently decided to stop assisting the Pakistan-based mujahideen parties and to focus instead on the mujahideen commanders and the AIG.

Meanwhile, political support for the administration's Afghan policy is declining both in the United States and around the world. Unless the situation changes in favor of the mujahideen, the Bush administration is likely to come under increasing pressure to accept terms on Afghanistan that it has refused so far—a United States-Soviet agreement to cut off arms to all Afghans or a political arrangement in Kabul that will not be dominated by the Pakistani-based mujahideen leaders.

In Pakistan, the Bush administration has maintained the close working relationship developed by the Reagan administration. The fear that after Zia's

death and the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan relations between the two countries would become more distant has not materialized. Of course, the United States and Pakistan continue to work very closely on Afghanistan and the war in that unfortunate country has not yet ended. Prime Minister Bhutto has expressed her desire to maintain and expand the relationship between the United States and Pakistan.

Washington appears to be optimistic that the United States can work with Bhutto on Afghanistan and even on the nuclear issue. Whether Bhutto can follow a nuclear policy that is significantly different from Zia's remains to be seen, but it appears unlikely. There are powerful individuals in Pakistan who will not permit any action that would be perceived as a unilateral concession to India.

In June, 1989, after Bhutto's visit, Rajiv Gandhi visited President Bush at his home in Maine. The President encouraged Gandhi to explore seriously a regional nuclear-restraint regime for South Asia, but Gandhi still rejects a regional approach to the nuclear problems in South Asia. On other regional issues—like the disputes between India and Sri Lanka and between India and Nepal—the Bush administration has kept a low profile in the hope that local governments will work out arrangements among themselves. Pakistan and the smaller South Asian states, which worry about Indian hegemony, have sought a more active United States role to support the smaller states.

PROSPECTS

With the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan and the improvement in Soviet-American relations, the relative importance of strategic factors that brought the United States back into South Asia in 1981 are declining. Over time, the relative importance of regional issues will once again grow. Will this lead to a significant decline in United States involvement in the region? It is certainly possible. The most important regional issue that affects United States interests is nuclear proliferation.

The war in Afghanistan has protected United States assistance to Pakistan in the United States Congress. In the future—probably after 1990—this may no longer be the case, especially if India and Pakistan fail to agree and if Pakistan continues to accumulate weapons-grade material. However, developments at the regional level make American disengagement difficult.

- **The level of regional nuclear capability.** Both India and Pakistan have an impressive ability to produce nuclear weapons. Only political constraints remain in the way of crossing the nuclear threshold unambiguously—either by testing or

stockpiling “finished” nuclear weapons. India has an impressive missile capability that could serve as a delivery vehicle for nuclear warheads. Pakistan is developing its own long-range missile capability. These developments have implications for United States interests in the nearby Persian Gulf (where the United States and its allies continue to have vital interests), for United States forces and facilities in the Indian Ocean region, and for the Soviet Union, too, because of its geographic proximity to South Asia.

If both India and Pakistan possessed nuclear weapons, India’s relative domination of the region would diminish. It is possible that, as Pakistani nuclear capability grows, the Indian interest in preventing the nuclearization of the region may increase. The United States and the Soviet Union together could facilitate a regional agreement on nuclear restraint. In the past, the Soviet Union has not been entirely helpful. It did not press India on this issue. The transfer of a nuclear submarine to the Indian navy in 1988 by Moscow is a recent example. But with the change in Soviet-American relations, Washington and Moscow should find it easier to cooperate on the proliferation problem.

But if the United States disengages—for example, by cutting off all assistance to Pakistan as it did in 1978—Pakistan could test a device or simply begin stockpiling “finished” weapons, given its present level of nuclear capability. Such a development would unleash a competition between India and Pakistan in the production of nuclear weapons and delivery systems. To discourage the United States from cutting off aid, Pakistan may signal such a course of action. As in the case of Israel, the United States may continue partial assistance in order to deter Pakistan from crossing the nuclear threshold.

• **Regional transformation.** Relative power is steadily shifting in favor of India at the regional level. If current trends continue—without Pakistani nuclearization or increased instability in India itself—the region could be dominated by India. Pakistan dreads such an outcome and it will seek to oppose its emergence. For Pakistan, strong ties with the United States are part of its efforts to resist Indian dominance. Pakistan’s strong ties with China and the Islamic countries to its west serve the same purpose.

The Indian push for regional superpower status creates several dilemmas for the United States. The United States could move closer to India as its relative power grows. If India achieves its objective, its interests and those of the Soviet Union are likely to clash. Indo-Soviet relations could change and even become hostile. But if India were to remain the dominant power in the region, it would also want the United States to reduce its presence. Indian am-

bition is not limited to South Asia, but extends to the Persian Gulf, where the West has vital interests of its own.

Since Pakistan will oppose Indian regional domination, the United States is likely to face a choice: supporting Pakistan’s balancing effort; seeking to maintain good relations with both; or staying out of the regional competition. As part of its balancing effort, Pakistan is likely to develop close economic relations with Iran and post-Najibullah Afghanistan. Building on economic relations, it can promote closer political and security integration. The likelihood that these three countries will come together is very difficult to predict, but it is possible. Such an effort, combined with increased Pakistani nuclear capability and a security relationship with a large outside power, can effectively contain Indian ambitions in the region. Pakistan presumably would prefer the United States to be that large outside power, but it probably would accept Chinese and even Soviet assistance. These possibilities have implications for United States interests in the Gulf and the United States-Soviet balance of power in the region and beyond.

• **The growing Persian Gulf-South Asia interconnection.** The tapestry of relations between South Asia and the Gulf (especially Pakistan) is changing. It is no longer realistic to think about the security of the Persian Gulf without taking the South Asian connection into account. This may become even more important in the coming decade.

These new linkages can be understood in the context of current and future weapons systems that are likely to be made available to the countries in the region. For example, the acquisition by Saudi Arabia of an IRBM (Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile) with a range of 2,000 miles led to speculation in both India and Israel that, at some future point, a Pakistani nuclear warhead and the Saudi IRBM might threaten Israel and India. Such scenarios are highly unrealistic, but nevertheless show that actors in the region see practical linkages between the Gulf and South Asia.

In the course of the next decade, Pakistan might develop its own IRBM. The Bhutto government is likely to try to cooperate closely with Iran—a key Persian Gulf state. These developments clearly will affect United States interests in the Gulf region.

• **Increased Soviet and Chinese activism.** Both China and the Soviet Union are becoming more active in the Persian Gulf. The Chinese decision to sell Silkworm missiles to Iran (during the Iran-Iraq War) and an IRBM to Saudi Arabia is a clear indication of its desire to play a role in the region. The Soviet Union has been successfully courting a number of states in the area—particularly Iran—since its withdrawal from Afghanistan. Depending

on what happens in Afghanistan, Moscow is likely to move to improve its relations with Pakistan as well. How far the Soviet Union goes to improve relations with Pakistan will almost certainly depend on its calculations on India. For the immediate future, India will remain central in the Soviet Union's regional policy. But should Pakistani-American relations deteriorate, the Soviet Union might seek to improve relations with Pakistan.

CONCLUSION

In the aftermath of the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, controversial issues like the Pakistani nuclear effort are likely to become more central in the United States approach to South Asia and Southwest Asia. Domestic political dynamics—and United States laws on nonproliferation—could lead to reduced United States involvement and influence in the region. The general tendency in the United States toward retrenchment will probably result in its decreased involvement in the region—especially after the Afghanistan situation is clarified. Nonetheless, decreasing United States activity in South Asia would not serve American interests. Remaining engaged is the best way to protect these interests. Actual and potential developments make the area important to the United States in a new way.

BOOK REVIEWS

(Continued from page 441)

heritage was crucial: the heat, the central role of water, the plains and mountains. Wolpert's prose flows like some great river, combining archaeological travelogue with the roots of cultural variety inside a single country. Wolpert introduces the book by recalling how he came to be "magnetized" by Indian civilization, changing his life's course. Reading this history, one can easily be swept up in his fascination.

D.E.S.

BREAKING THE CURFEW: A POLITICAL JOURNEY THROUGH PAKISTAN. By Emma Duncan. (London: Michael Joseph, 1989. 313 pages and index, \$22.95.)

Emma Duncan, the South Asia correspondent for *The Economist*, traveled around Pakistan, talking with average people about their country, their politics and their views of the modern world. This book represents her distillation of those conversations, organized by topic and by social group. She describes the flavor of Pakistan, with its contradictions and its passions, its feet in the past and its eyes toward the future. As a Western non-Muslim woman, she comments on how foreign she feels in Pakistani society; yet as a

foreigner she is able to gain access to political leaders and businessmen who would shy away from talking to a woman compatriot. This portrait of Pakistan provides a window into the politics and lives of the people in this land, caught between the desire for Western-style democracy, geographic realities and historical allegiances.

D.E.S.

MISCELLANEOUS

THE FAR EAST AND AUSTRALASIA 1989.

20th edition. (London: Europa Publications Ltd., 1989. 1,048 pages, \$210.00.)

The 20th edition of this fine reference series, *The Far East and Australasia 1989*, covers a region as far west as Afghanistan and as far east as the most far-flung Pacific Islands, with a separate chapter on Soviet Asia. Introductory chapters discuss regional trends like progress toward integration, population growth and major commodity production. Another section is devoted to regional organizations including ANZUS (the Australia-New Zealand-United States security treaty), the ADB (the Asian Development Bank) and ASEAN (the Association of South East Asian Nations). Separate chapters discuss the geography, history and economy of individual countries.

D.E.S.

THE PACIFIC ISLANDS. 3d edition. By Douglas L. Oliver. (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1989. 304 pages, index and bibliography, \$14.95.)

"There are more than 10,000 Pacific Islands, ranging from tiny coral islets to vast New Guinea, which is as large as Texas." Thus begins the first chapter of this standard reference and text first published in 1951. Since the 2d edition in 1961, *The Pacific Islands* has been revised and supplemented to include the most recent anthropological and historical findings. Although the period covered only goes up to 1950, the book is a fine introduction to the ethnology, geography and politics of the region.

D.E.S.

(Continued on page 464)

Erratum: We regret errors in the translation of footnotes 5, 17 and 32 in Mark Kramer's article in the October, 1989, issue. In addition, on page 350, line 16, a footnote was inadvertently omitted after the word "climb." The footnote should read "United States Defense Intelligence Agency, 'Military Production Tables,' December 21, 1988, in United States Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Subcommittee on National Security Economics, *Allocation of Resources in the Soviet Union and China—1987*, part 13, 100th Congress, 2d Session, April, 1988, pp. 111-112."

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

A Current History chronology covering the most important events of October, 1989, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

INTERNATIONAL

Arab League

(See *Lebanon*)

Central American Peace Plan

Oct. 27—Before a 2-day summit meeting in San José, Costa Rica, to celebrate that country's centennial of democracy, Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega Saavedra says that he will end the 19-month-old cease-fire with the contra rebels November 1. Ortega charges that the rebels and the Nicaraguan opposition party, the National Opposition Union (UNO), "are endangering the electoral process" in Nicaragua and the elections set for February, 1990.

Oct. 28—Ortega says he will continue to honor the cease-fire if the U.S. stops helping the contras.

At the meeting, U.S. President George Bush makes disparaging remarks about Ortega.

Commonwealth of Nations

Oct. 22—Meeting in Malaysia, the Commonwealth nations say they will implement new sanctions against South Africa within 6 months if South Africa does not move to dismantle its apartheid system.

Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species

Oct. 6—The 103-nation convention votes to ban all trade in ivory; however, 5 African countries say they will make formal reservations on the decision, which will permit them to continue to sell ivory.

Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)

(See also *Intl*, *UN*; *Israel*)

Oct. 11—The PLO decides to wait for 2 years to apply for membership in Unesco (the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization).

Oct. 16—Meeting in Iraq, the PLO central committee ends a 2-day session and rejects the U.S.-sponsored plan for talks between the PLO and Israel.

United Nations (UN)

(See also *Intl*, *PLO*; *El Salvador*)

Oct. 6—The General Assembly votes to condemn Israel for its treatment of Palestinians in the Israeli-occupied territories; 140 nations support the resolution, 2 nations oppose it, 6 nations abstain and 11 nations are not present for the vote.

Oct. 12—The General Assembly ends its annual 3-week debate on world problems.

Oct. 18—Cuba, Romania and South Yemen begin 2-year terms as members of the Security Council.

AFGHANISTAN

(See also *U.S.S.R.*; *U.S.*, *Foreign Policy*)

Oct. 29—*The New York Times* reports that the Pakistan-based Afghan guerrilla government-in-exile plans to hold elections in Afghanistan before February, 1990.

ANGOLA

(See also *U.S.*, *Foreign Policy*)

Oct. 5—UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence

of Angola) leader Jonas Savimbi says he will resume peace talks with the government.

ARGENTINA

Oct. 6—President Carlos Saul Menem pardons officers accused of crimes and misconduct during the "dirty war" of the 1970's and 1980's, the 1982 conflict with Great Britain in the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands and 3 military insurrections in 1987 and 1988.

CAMBODIA

Oct. 15—*The New York Times* reports that an offensive by the Khmer People's National Liberation Front, part of the non-Communist coalition fighting the Cambodian government, is failing in northwestern Cambodia.

Oct. 25—According to Western diplomats, Khmer Rouge troops have seized Pailan, a district capital in northwest Cambodia.

CHINA

(See also *India*; *U.K.*, *Hong Kong*)

Oct. 1—The People's Republic of China celebrates the 40th anniversary of its founding. Festivities in Beijing are heavily guarded and no foreign heads of state attend.

Oct. 5—The Dalai Lama, the political and spiritual leader of Tibet, is awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his nonviolent campaign to end China's control of Tibet.

Oct. 8—*The New York Times* reports that in September, urban workers were told by their employers that for up to 4 months their take-home pay would be reduced by one-third to two-thirds. The difference is to be paid in a 3-year interest-bearing bond.

Oct. 10—*People's Daily*, the Communist party newspaper, announces that General Secretary Jiang Zemin will "serve as the core of the third generation of Chinese leaders" and will succeed de facto leader Deng Xiaoping.

China breaks diplomatic relations with Liberia 1 day after Liberia restores relations with Taiwan.

Oct. 15—*The New York Times* reports that the State Council has issued a secret report attacking former Communist party General Secretary Zhao Ziyang, holding him responsible for China's economic and political troubles.

In Beijing, the Communist party calls for a purge of party members to root out supporters of the democracy movement. The party will expel "a very small number of hostile and anti-party elements."

Oct. 18—Officials report that new confidential documents have been published that impose severe restrictions on students planning to study abroad, including requirements that students work in China for up to 7 years before going abroad.

Oct. 26—According to a Communist party official, last week Chinese leaders decided to end martial law in Beijing. Martial law was imposed on May 20.

COLOMBIA

Oct. 5—President Virgilio Barco Vargas names Roberto Salazar Manrique as Justice Minister; Salazar replaces Monica de Greiff, who resigned on September 21.

COSTA RICA(See *Intl, Central American Peace Plan; El Salvador*)**CUBA**(See *Intl, UN*)**CZECHOSLOVAKIA**(See also *Germany, East*)

- Oct. 27—On the eve of the 71st anniversary of the founding of Czechoslovakia's democratic government, the government rounds up prominent dissidents.
- Oct. 28—A march staged by 10,000 prodemocracy protesters turns violent as riot police break up the demonstration.

EGYPT(See *Israel; Libya*)**EL SALVADOR**

- Oct. 2—Addressing the UN, El Salvador's President Alfredo Cristiani says his government will propose a total cease-fire with the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) at talks scheduled for mid-October in Costa Rica.
- Oct. 3—FMLN leaders reject Cristiani's cease-fire proposal as "unreal and impractical."
- Oct. 18—Three days of talks between FMLN representatives and government officials end in Costa Rica without agreement; however, the guerrillas and the government will send representatives to Venezuela in November for further talks.
- Oct. 31—In the 2d bombing in 12 hours in San Salvador, a bomb explosion at the headquarters of a leftist labor group kills 8 people.

FINLAND(See *U.S.S.R.*)**GERMANY, EAST**

- Oct. 1—More than 6,000 East German emigrés arrive in the West German border town of Hof; the emigrés traveled from Czechoslovakia and Poland under a plan approved by East German General Secretary Erich Honecker.
- Oct. 2—The West German embassy in Prague, Czechoslovakia, reports that more than 2,500 East Germans have entered its grounds seeking passage to West Germany.
- Oct. 3—East Germany allows emigrés already in Czechoslovakia to leave for West Germany and then announces the suspension of travel to Czechoslovakia for citizens without passports or visas.
- Oct. 4—On the eve of the 40th anniversary of Communist rule, thousands of East Germans flood the Dresden railroad station to try to board trains going to West Germany.
- Oct. 6—Addressing a special celebration in East Berlin, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev says East German policy is determined "not in Moscow, but in Berlin."
- Oct. 8—In East Berlin, Dresden and Leipzig, security forces clash with protesters calling for democratic reforms.
- Oct. 9—The government allows 50,000 demonstrators to protest in Leipzig.
- Oct. 11—The Politburo issues a statement admitting the need "to discuss all basic questions" of East German society.
- Oct. 16—In the largest protest in East Germany since 1953, 100,000 people in Leipzig demand government reforms.
- Oct. 18—Citing illness, Erich Honecker resigns from public office. Politburo member Egon Krenz assumes Honecker's 3 positions—ruling party leader, head of state and chairman of the Defense Council.
- Propaganda Minister Joachim Herrmann and Economic Minister Günter Mittag resign from office.
- Oct. 23—A crowd estimated at 300,000 gathers in Leipzig to

voice its support for democratic reforms. Similar rallies are held in 5 other East German cities.

- Oct. 24—The Parliament formally elects Egon Krenz as President, but 26 members of the 500-member Parliament vote against him.
- Oct. 26—In East Berlin, Politburo member Günter Schabowski meets with 2 members of the New Forum opposition movement; the East German government considers the movement illegal.
- Oct. 27—The Interior Ministry announces amnesty for people who have fled or have attempted to flee from East Germany and for people arrested in recent demonstrations; a ban on travel to Czechoslovakia for East Germans without visas is also lifted.
- Oct. 29—Town meetings between Communist officials and citizens with grievances against the government are held in every major East German city.

GERMANY, WEST(See *Germany, East*)**HUNGARY**

- Oct. 6—The special congress of the ruling Hungarian Socialist Workers party opens in Budapest. Rezső Nyers, the head of the 4-member collective presidency, tells delegates that the party should change its basic image and combine "social democratic and Communist traditions, values and practices."
- Oct. 7—By a vote of 1,005 to 159, the delegates to the special ruling party congress change the party's name to the Hungarian Socialist party; in addition, the delegates reject orthodox Marxism and vow to institute social democratic reform.
- Oct. 9—Rezső Nyers is elected president of the Hungarian Socialist party.
- Oct. 19—Opposition parties are allowed to operate legally; in addition, Prime Minister Miklós Németh orders the dissolution of Communist cell groups in workplaces.
- Oct. 23—Hungary marks the 33d anniversary of the 1956 uprising by changing its name to the Republic of Hungary.

INDIA

- Oct. 10—As Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi is addressing a special session of Parliament, he is shouted down by the opposition demanding his resignation. Gandhi has refused to answer questions about alleged kickbacks paid in 1986 in a weapons deal with the Swedish company Bofors.
- Oct. 13—Gandhi loses votes in the upper house of Parliament on two constitutional amendments concerning local governments.
- Gandhi meets with Chinese Deputy Prime Minister Wu Xueqian, the highest-ranking Chinese official to visit India in 30 years.
- Oct. 14—Opposition leader Vishwanath Pratap Singh says that because he fears fraud, he opposes the use of computerized voting machines in the upcoming national election.
- At a Muslim festival in Indore, 14 people are killed and about 100 are injured as a result of fighting between Hindus, Muslims and the police.
- Oct. 17—Gandhi calls for general elections on November 22 and 24, rather than in January, 1990, as originally planned.
- Oct. 31—Newspapers in India publish excerpts from the diary of a Bofors executive; the excerpts detail a meeting between consultants for the Swedish company and a lawyer for Prime Minister Gandhi.

INDONESIA

- Oct. 12—Pope John Paul II visits East Timor, chiding Indonesia for the violence there and appealing for reconciliation. He is the first world leader to visit the largely Roman

Catholic East Timor since mostly Muslim Indonesia annexed it in 1976.

- Oct. 18—Amnesty International (AI) says 40 people in East Timor have been arrested for participating in a pro-independence protest during the Pope's visit. AI claims that it has received reports that detainees have been mistreated or otherwise tortured.

IRAN

(See also *Lebanon*)

- Oct. 23—President Hashemi Rafsanjani offers to help secure the release of American hostages in Lebanon if the U.S. returns Iranian assets frozen since 1979 and helps free 3 Iranian diplomats taken hostage in Lebanon.

IRAQ

(See *Intl, PLO*)

ISRAEL

(See also *Intl, PLO, UN*)

- Oct. 1—Israel appeals to the U.S. for \$400 million in loans to help house Soviet emigrés to Israel.
- Oct. 3—Peace advocate Abie Nathan is sentenced by a magistrate's court to 6 months in prison for meeting with PLO leader Yasir Arafat in 1988.
- Oct. 6—The Cabinet rejects Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak's plan to host Israeli-Palestinian peace talks in Cairo.
- Oct. 7—Foreign Minister Moshe Arens, a leader of the Likud party, accuses the Labor party of attempting to bring down the coalition government by forcing talks with the Palestinians.
- Oct. 11—A pilot of a Syrian MiG-23 fighter-bomber, Major General Mohammed Bassem Adel, lands his plane in Israel; Israeli officials say the pilot asked for asylum.
- Oct. 16—Army chief of staff General Dan Shomron says an investigation has found that Adel was allowed into Israel because "an officer did not exercise correct judgment."
- Oct. 24—The U.S. State Department receives a letter from Foreign Minister Arens accepting "in principle" U.S. proposals for Israeli-Palestinian talks; however, the letter states 2 "reservations."

JAPAN

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy, Labor and Industry*)

- Oct. 1—Japan ends its government monopoly on international telephone service; two new companies inaugurate service.
- Oct. 2—In his first speech to Parliament as Prime Minister, Toshiki Kaifu asks Parliament to lower domestic prices, reduce income disparities and cease "concentrating single-mindedly on economic efficiency."
- Oct. 3—Upholding a previous decision, the Tokyo District Court rules that the government has the right to censor history textbooks, including the right to tone down descriptions of Japanese activities in World War II.
- Oct. 12—New charges of influence-peddling are made against members of the ruling Liberal Democratic party and the Japan Socialist party after it is disclosed that pachinko (pin-ball) parlors donated about \$1 million to important politicians.

JORDAN

(See *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

KOREA, NORTH

(See *Korea, South; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

KOREA, SOUTH

- Oct. 12—Anti-American students briefly occupy the residence

of the U.S. ambassador in Seoul after scaling the wall of the embassy compound. Riot police overpower the students, who were armed with firebombs. No injuries are reported.

- Oct. 13—In Seoul, President Roh Tae Woo says that South Korea will pay more of the cost of stationing U.S. troops in South Korea.

Oct. 16—For the 2d time since 1945, North Korea and South Korea agree to permit family reunion visits.

Oct. 17—In Washington, D.C., Roh pledges to take steps to reduce the South Korean trade surplus with the U.S. by the mid-1990's by reducing tariffs and nontariff barriers.

Oct. 18—Addressing the U.S. Congress, Roh urges the U.S. not to withdraw its 43,000 troops from South Korea. This is the first time a South Korean President has addressed Congress since 1954.

Oct. 24—South Korea agrees to purchase 120 fighter planes from American manufacturers; because of this sale, U.S. negotiators are willing to allow a co-production deal for other aircraft. This arrangement has been opposed by U.S. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney.

LEBANON

(See also *Iran; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

- Oct. 1—At peace talks on Lebanon in Taif, Saudi Arabia, surviving Parliament members debate the continued presence of Syrian soldiers in Lebanon. The talks, which are sponsored by the Arab League, began on September 30.
- Oct. 4—Druze and Muslim militia leaders meet in Iran and condemn the Arab League-sponsored talks.
- Oct. 6—In Sidon, masked gunmen seize 2 members of the international committee of the Red Cross.
- Oct. 7—The international committee of the Red Cross suspends operations in Sidon.
- Oct. 14—Christian militia leader General Michel Aoun warns the 31 Christian legislators at the Taif peace talks that they should not make concessions that would threaten "the country's sovereignty."
- Oct. 18—The Arab League proposes to facilitate a Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon if Lebanese Christians agree to amend the constitution to give Lebanese Muslims more power.
- Oct. 22—Talks conclude in Taif as legislators reach an accord. The agreement calls for a new constitution with an increased role for Muslims and for the redeployment of Syrian forces to the Bekka Valley.
- In Beirut, General Aoun says the accord is unacceptable because it "keeps Lebanon under the Syrian mandate."
- Oct. 24—The representatives at Taif formally adopt the charter approved on October 22; Saudi Arabia proposes that the Lebanese Parliament convene in Lebanon in November to elect a new President.
- About 15,000 Christian protesters demonstrate in Beirut in a show of support for Aoun.

LIBERIA

(See *China*)

LIBYA

- Oct. 16—Libyan leader Colonel Muammar Qaddafi travels to Egypt for the 1st time in 16 years and meets with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak.
- Oct. 25—In an interview in an Egyptian magazine, Qaddafi admits that Libya has sponsored terrorists, but claims that it has stopped supporting terrorist groups because "they were practicing terrorism for the sake of terrorism."

MALAYSIA

(See *Intl, Commonwealth of Nations*)

MEXICO(See *U.S., Foreign Policy*)**MYANMAR**

Oct. 7—After hijacking an airliner to Thailand on October 6 to publicize human rights abuses in Myanmar, 2 Burmese students surrender to Thai security forces.

Oct. 20—Military leaders announce that anyone in detention at the time of next year's general election may not participate as a candidate. Opposition leaders Aung San Suu Kyi and U Tin Oo have been under house arrest since July 20.

NICARAGUA(See also *Intl, Central American Peace Plan; U.S., Legislation*)

Oct. 27—Government soldiers begin a combat operation against contra forces located in the northeast region of San Marcos.

PAKISTAN(See *Afghanistan; U.S., Foreign Policy*)**PANAMA**(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Oct. 3—A group of officers tries to oust Panamanian de facto leader General Manuel Antonio Noriega, but the coup is put down by troops loyal to Noriega.

Appearing on television later in the day, Noriega blames the "permanent aggression" of the U.S. for the attempted coup.

Oct. 5—Noriega calls for a crackdown on government opponents; government and paramilitary forces arrest opposition leaders.

Oct. 8—Diplomats in Panama say that moments after the October 3 coup attempt failed, Noriega ordered the immediate execution of officers involved in the coup, including the coup's leader, Major Moisés Giroldi Vega. The Panamanian government claims that the rebels died in battle with Noriega's forces.

PHILIPPINES

Oct. 1—Supporters of former President Ferdinand Marcos rally in Manila demanding that the government allow his remains to be buried in the Philippines. Marcos died on September 28.

Oct. 15—Marcos is buried in Hawaii.

Oct. 21—*The New York Times* reports that the Philippine government is gaining in its war against the Communist rebels.

Oct. 26—President Corazon Aquino reiterates her pledge not to run for a second term.

Oct. 27—The Supreme Court upholds Aquino's ban on burying Marcos in the Philippines.

POLAND

Oct. 6—Deputy Prime Minister Leszek Balcerowicz announces a plan to switch to a market-based economy in Poland; however, Balcerowicz warns that the change will take place "in a very difficult economic situation."

Oct. 16—Parliament passes a bill to offer compensation to workers for Poland's worsening inflation.

Oct. 20—Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki visits Pope John Paul II in Rome.

ROMANIA(See *Intl, UN*)**SAUDI ARABIA**(See *Lebanon*)**SINGAPORE**

Oct. 9—Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew announces that he will step down at the end of 1990 but will stay in the Cabinet as a senior minister.

SOUTH AFRICA(See also *Intl, Commonwealth of Nations*)

Oct. 10—President F. W. de Klerk announces that 8 anti-apartheid leaders, including high-ranking ANC (African National Congress) official Walter Sisulu, will be released from custody.

Oct. 11—Archbishop Desmond Tutu, the Reverend Allan Boesak and the Reverend Frank Chikane talk with President de Klerk in Pretoria; Archbishop Tutu offers to recommend that economic sanctions against South Africa should be lifted if de Klerk meets conditions for negotiations with anti-apartheid groups.

Oct. 15—At a news conference following their release, 7 of the 8 anti-apartheid leaders ask the government to free ANC leader Nelson Mandela.

Oct. 17—Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning Gerrit Viljoen says that the government may include the ANC as "only one of a number of possible negotiation partners" in talks with South Africa's black majority.

Oct. 29—With the government's permission, 70,000 people attend a rally near Soweto that is sponsored by the ANC.

SPAIN

Oct. 30—The final results of the October 29 general election are announced; Prime Minister Felipe González's Socialist Workers party retains its majority in Parliament by 1 seat.

SRI LANKA

Oct. 28—The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam say that they are ready to take part in provincial elections and stop fighting.

SWEDEN(See also *India*)

Oct. 12—An appeals court overturns the conviction of Carl Gustav Pettersson for the murder of Prime Minister Olof Palme in 1986, saying that the evidence is inadequate; the court orders Pettersson's immediate release.

SYRIA(See *Israel; Lebanon*)**TAIWAN**(See also *China*)

Oct. 10—Demonstrators demand freedom for political prisoners, while the government holds a National Day parade.

THAILAND(See *Myanmar*)**TURKEY**

Oct. 31—In a session boycotted by the opposition, Parliament elects Turgut Ozal as President. Deputy Prime Minister Ali Bozer becomes the caretaker Prime Minister until Ozal asks someone to form a government.

U.S.S.R.(See also *Germany, East; Israel; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Oct. 3—The Supreme Soviet rejects a government request for a 15-month strike ban; however, a selective prohibition of strikes in crucial industries is allowed.

Oct. 5—Estonia suspends part of its controversial law requiring residency for participation in local elections.

Oct. 8—The news agency Tass reports that Azerbaijani railroad workers are defying the central government ban on transport strikes and are preventing supplies from reaching Armenia.

Oct. 9—The Supreme Soviet enacts a law that enables workers to strike under certain conditions.

Oct. 10—The Azerbaijani nationalist group leading the rail boycott of Armenia promises to allow supplies to go to Armenia.

Oct. 17—*The New York Times* reports that President Mikhail Gorbachev met with a group of Soviet editors on October 12, severely chastising several liberal editors for publishing articles he felt were offensive.

Vladislav Starkov, the editor of the Soviet weekly *Argumenty i Fakty*, says that the party's ideological chief, Vadim Medvedev, has ordered Starkov's newspaper to fire him.

The World Psychiatric Association conditionally readmits the Soviet Union.

Oct. 19—Ivan Frolov, a close aide to President Gorbachev, replaces Viktor Afanasyev as editor of *Pravda*.

Oct. 23—Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze tells the Supreme Soviet that the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan was a violation of Soviet and international law; he also labels the Krasnoyarsk radar complex in Siberia "an open violation" of the ABM (anti-ballistic missile) treaty with the U.S.

Oct. 24—The Supreme Soviet passes a measure eliminating the policy of reserving special seats for Communist party and official public organizations in national and local elections.

Oct. 25—The state bank devalues the ruble exchange rate for foreigners living in the Soviet Union from U.S.\$1.60 to U.S.\$0.16.

Oct. 26—In Helsinki, Finland, Gorbachev reveals that the Soviet Union will destroy 4 of its nuclear submarines based in the Baltic Sea.

Oct. 30—A peaceful demonstration is held outside secret police (KGB) headquarters in Moscow; however, a 2d demonstration in nearby Pushkin Square becomes violent when agitated protesters clash with riot police.

UNITED KINGDOM

Great Britain

(See also *Argentina*)

Oct. 2—The Labor party renounces its commitment to unilateral nuclear disarmament; party leader Neil Kinnock has blamed Labor's stance on this issue for the last 10 years of defeat in general elections.

Oct. 13—In Blackpool, a Conservative party conference ends when the delegates give Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher a standing ovation on her 64th birthday. The Conservatives have trailed the Labor party in recent public opinion polls because of increasing inflation and interest rates.

Oct. 26—Chancellor of the Exchequer Nigel Lawson resigns in a dispute with chief economic adviser Sir Alan Walters. Prime Minister Thatcher names Foreign Secretary John Major to replace Lawson and Home Secretary Douglas Hurd as the new Foreign Secretary.

Hours after Lawson's resignation, Walters announces his own resignation.

Hong Kong

Oct. 9—Reacting to Hong Kong's refusal to return a Chinese swimmer seeking asylum, China refuses to accept the routine return of 70 illegal Chinese immigrants from Hong Kong.

Oct. 23—Hong Kong government officials announce that China will continue to accept illegal Chinese immigrants deported from Hong Kong. In return, the Hong Kong government pledges that Hong Kong will not "become a base to subvert the Beijing government."

UNITED STATES

Administration

Oct. 4—The Justice Department files suit against Phoenix, Detroit, San Antonio and El Paso for violating the Clean Water Act. The cities are accused of not controlling industrial toxic waste discharges into their sewer systems.

The Treasury Department announces plans to regulate international money transfers by U.S. banks in an effort to control illegal money-laundering.

Oct. 6—President George Bush undergoes minor surgery for the removal of a cyst from a finger.

Oct. 11—The Census Bureau reports that it estimates the nation's Hispanic population has grown to almost 20 million; in 1980, it estimated the Hispanic population at 14.5 million.

Oct. 16—Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) director William Webster asks Congress and President Bush to give his agency more latitude to support coup attempts against foreign dictators.

Oct. 17—President Bush selects Dr. Antonia Novello, an opponent of abortion, to succeed C. Everett Koop as U.S. Surgeon General.

Oct. 18—The Treasury Department formally notifies Congress that it should increase the national debt ceiling by October 24; the current ceiling of \$3.1 trillion expires on October 31.

The Census Bureau reports that the number of Americans living below the poverty level (\$13,120 for a family of 4) remained at about 32 million in 1988.

Oct. 19—The Social Security Administration announces that beneficiaries will receive a 4.7 percent rise in benefits starting in 1990.

Oct. 31—Administration officials and congressional leaders reach a compromise on increasing the minimum wage from \$3.35 per hour to \$3.80 per hour in 1990 and \$4.25 per hour in 1991.

Disasters

Oct. 17—An earthquake with a rating of 6.9 to 7.1 on the Richter scale of measurement hits the San Francisco Bay area at 5:04 P.M. Pacific time. The earthquake, centered about 80 miles south of San Francisco, causes the collapse of a section of the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge and a portion of Interstate Highway 880 in Oakland, where the upper level collapses onto the lower level.

Oct. 18—Earthquake-stricken San Francisco struggles to find trapped survivors, put out fires and restore services.

Oct. 24—According to officials in the 7 California counties affected by the October 17 quake, 63 persons were killed and thousands were injured or made homeless. The quake caused an estimated \$7.1 billion in damage.

Economy

Oct. 6—The Labor Department reports that the unemployment rate rose to 5.2 percent in September.

Oct. 9—The New York Stock Exchange's Dow Jones Industrial Average of 30 blue-chip stocks closes at a new high of 2,791.41.

Oct. 13—The Dow Jones average falls 190.58 points, its second largest decline; on October 19, 1987, the Dow Jones average fell 508 points.

Oct. 14—The Federal Reserve Board says it is prepared to meet any sudden demands for cash resulting from the stock market plunge.

Oct. 16—The Dow Jones average rises 88.12 points to recover almost half its October 13 loss.

Oct. 17—The Commerce Department reports that the U.S. foreign trade deficit for August was \$10.8 billion.

Oct. 19—The Labor Department says that its consumer price index rose 0.2 percent in September.

Oct. 26—The Commerce Department reports that the nation's gross national product (GNP) grew at an annual rate of 2.5 percent in the 3d quarter of 1989.

Oct. 31—The Commerce Department reports that the index of leading economic indicators rose 0.2 percent in September.

Foreign Policy

(See also *Intl. Central American Peace Plan, PLO; Iran; Israel; Korea, South; Panama; Philippines; U.S.S.R.*)

Oct. 3—In Washington, D.C., President Bush and Mexico's President Carlos Salinas de Gortari sign an agreement intended to increase trade and investment "for both sides of the border." The two leaders also sign an environmental agreement designed to deal with pollution problems.

President Bush denies that the U.S. was involved in the coup attempt on Panama's de facto leader General Manuel Noriega; however, administration officials admit U.S. knowledge of the attempt.

Oct. 4—President Bush meets in Washington, D.C., with Zaire's President Mobutu Sese Seko and expresses his support for Mobutu's mediation efforts in the Angolan civil war, where the cease-fire of June 22 seems to be breaking down.

Lebanese hijacker Fawaz Yunis, lured into U.S. custody in 1987, is sentenced to 30 years in prison for his role in the seizure of a Jordanian airliner in Beirut; 2 U.S. citizens were passengers on the hijacked plane.

Oct. 9—In a report prepared for the State Department and the White House, administration officials say that Soviet advisers and technical personnel involved with Scud missiles used by the Afghan government are wearing Afghan uniforms and are probably in violation of the Geneva accords of April, 1988, calling for the complete withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan.

Oct. 11—It is reported that on October 5, President Bush sent a letter of certification as required by law to Congress stating that Pakistan does not possess nuclear weapons; he expressed his concern that Pakistan was trying to develop such weapons.

Oct. 16—In a speech to the Foreign Policy Association, Secretary of State James Baker 3d says that the U.S. is prepared to help "perestroika succeed" because its success will lead to "Soviet actions more advantageous to our interests."

Oct. 24—*The New York Times* reports that Bush administration officials have expressed concern that North Korea is developing nuclear weapons. Secretary of State James Baker has reportedly discussed with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze North Korea's failure to install international safeguards at its nuclear plants.

Oct. 26—Baker prevents Deputy National Security Adviser Robert Gates from delivering a speech regarded by Baker and the administration as too pessimistic about Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's chances of survival.

Oct. 27—In Washington, D.C., U.S. trade representative Carla Hills calls on Japan to take the actions necessary to force Japanese companies to end restrictive practices against imports; she warns of stricter U.S. trade sanctions.

Oct. 31—President Bush announces that he will meet with Soviet President Gorbachev on U.S. and Soviet naval vessels in the Mediterranean in December, 1989, for 2 days of talks.

Labor and Industry

Oct. 30—The Rockefeller Group, which owns Rockefeller Center, Radio City Music Hall and other real estate in New York City, sells a 51 percent interest in the Group to Mitsubishi Estate Company of Tokyo for \$846 million in cash.

Legislation

Oct. 4—The House votes 360 to 66 to repeal the year-old

legislation that expands health benefits for older citizens and to repeal the taxes and premiums that pay for the benefits.

Oct. 7—The Senate completes congressional action, voting 91 to 6, to approve a measure to continue federal funding of the arts. However, the measure denies funding for art considered obscene; the House has passed the measure.

Oct. 11—The House votes 216 to 206 to restore federal funding of abortions for poor pregnant victims of rape or incest.

Oct. 12—The House votes 371 to 43 to approve a measure already passed by the Senate that makes illegal the desecration of the American flag.

Oct. 16—President Bush signs an order that calls for \$16.1 billion in automatic spending cuts because Congress has failed to meet the October 15 deadline for deficit reduction measures.

Oct. 17—The Senate votes 64 to 35 to approve a measure already approved by the House to send \$9 million to support parties opposing the Sandinistas in the February, 1990, elections in Nicaragua.

Oct. 19—The Senate votes 51 to 48 to approve a constitutional amendment outlawing the desecration of the American flag; this vote is short of the necessary two-thirds vote needed to pass a constitutional amendment.

The Senate votes 67 to 31 to approve a measure that would restore federal funding for abortions for poor pregnant victims of rape or incest.

Oct. 20—The Senate votes 69 to 26 to convict (and remove from office) U.S. District Court Judge Alcee Hastings on 8 articles of impeachment.

Oct. 21—President Bush vetoes the bill permitting federal funding of abortions for poor victims of rape or incest.

Oct. 25—The House votes 303 to 107 and the Senate votes 97 to 1 to approve a measure providing \$4.15 billion in emergency disaster relief for earthquake victims in northern California and for the victims of Hurricane Hugo in South Carolina.

The House votes 231 to 191, failing to muster the two-thirds majority needed to overrule President Bush's veto of the legislation that would have provided federal funding for abortions for poor women who are pregnant as a result of incest or rape.

Oct. 27—President Bush vetoes a budget measure for the District of Columbia that would have allowed use of more federal and District funds for abortions.

Political Scandal

Oct. 24—In Washington, D.C., U.S. District Court Judge Harold Greene rules that former National Security Adviser John Poindexter may subpoena the diaries and private papers of former President Ronald Reagan in order to substantiate his claim that Reagan authorized many of Poindexter's actions in the Iran-contra affair. The judge refuses to allow Poindexter access to the papers of President Bush, then Vice President.

Oct. 27—Former Housing and Urban Development (HUD) Secretary Samuel Pierce Jr. invokes the 5th Amendment and refuses to answer questions posed by a House subcommittee investigating HUD.

Science and Space

Oct. 18—After 2 postponements, the space shuttle *Atlantis* is launched successfully and subsequently launches the *Galileo* space probe toward Jupiter.

Supreme Court

Oct. 2—The Supreme Court opens its 1989-1990 term.

VATICAN

(See *Indonesia, Poland*)

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DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE PACIFIC ISLANDS. *Edited by A. D. Couper.* (London and New York: Routledge, 1989. 203 pages, index and bibliography, \$55.00.)

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